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To combat climate change, many leading states have 
adopted the aim of creating a “participatory” grid. In this 
new model, electricity is priced based on time of consumption 
and carbon content, and consumers are encouraged to adjust 
their behavior and adopt new technologies to maintain 
affordable electricity. Although a more participatory grid is 
an important component of lowering greenhouse gas 
emissions, it also raises a new problem of clean energy 
justice: utilities and consumer advocates claim that such 
policies unjustly benefit the rich at the expense of the poor, 
given the type of consumer best able to participate in the 
grid. These arguments pitting clean energy against equity 
often prove persuasive to energy regulators considering 
whether to adopt or maintain clean energy policies. 
But these arguments fail to seriously engage the question of 
how energy law’s historical equity norms should be 
interpreted and applied in the era of climate change. This 
Article concludes that there are legitimate and 
underappreciated equity concerns with the participatory 
grid, given that participation in the grid is likely to stratify 
along income lines. However, these equity concerns do not 
justify slowing progress on climate change, given the extreme 
inequities raised by that problem itself. Fortunately, 
however, there is a longstanding tradition of attention to 
equity concerns within electricity law that paves a way 
forward. Throughout the twentieth-century project of 
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electrification, electricity law focused on expanding the range 
of Americans able to access affordable electricity. Twenty-
first century regulators, in contrast, plan to require 
consumers to participate in the grid in order to maintain 
affordable power. This new vision requires a new 
instantiation of electricity law’s long-standing equity 
commitment: a project of “clean electrification,” which seeks 
to expand participation in emerging clean energy 
marketplaces to all Americans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1990s, the environmental justice movement has 
persuasively argued that environmentalism suffers from a 
class and race problem, given the ways in which environmental 
laws appear to concentrate environmental harms in low-income 
and minority communities.1 Responding to this critique, 
environmentalists and politicians have more recently 
celebrated the potential for clean energy policies to benefit low-
income and minority communities by providing secure, well-
paying jobs.2 Some such jobs are materializing, particularly in 
the booming field of rooftop solar energy,3 but with unfortunate 
side effects: the suite of policies boosting green jobs also creates 
a new genre of environmental justice challenges,4 which this 
Article terms “clean energy justice.” 
The clean energy justice concerns addressed here focus on 
the inequitable effects of clean energy policies, which may often 
disproportionately benefit the wealthy while leaving remaining 
 
 1. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The 
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV.  787, 790 
(1993); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: 
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
MOVEMENT 31–32 (2001). For a recent prominent example, see John Eligon, A 
Question of Environmental Racism in Flint, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/us/a-question-of-environmental-racism-in-
flint.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MS22-3Q43]. 
 2. In THE END OF ENERGY, Michael Graetz quotes President Obama as 
promising “[m]illions of new jobs. Jobs that pay well” as a result of clean energy 
policies. MICHAEL GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY 167 (2011); See also VAN JONES 
WITH ARIANE CONRAD, THE GREEN COLLAR ECONOMY: HOW ONE SOLUTION CAN 
FIX OUR TWO BIGGEST PROBLEMS 10–11 (2008); Michael Bastasch, Hillary Mimics 
Obama and Promises “Millions of Green Jobs,” DAILY CALLER (June 15, 2015), 
http://dailycaller.com/2015/06/15/hillary-mimics-obama-and-promises-millions-of-
green-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/KC9P-VDKC]. But see Michelle Chen, Where Have 
All the Green Jobs Gone?, THE NATION (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/ 
article/where-have-all-green-jobs-gone/ [https://perma.cc/27AV-RRAF] (chronicling 
the disappointment of many in the labor movement as green jobs have failed to 
provide large-scale, long-term employment solutions). Graetz advocates “[a] hefty 
dose of skepticism” about the green jobs rhetoric. Supra at 169. 
 3. See Cristina Maza, Solar Power: The Next Energy Jobs Juggernaut?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
Environment/Energy/2016/0114/Solar-power-the-next-energy-jobs-juggernaut  
[https://perma.cc/DYK9-Y7VR] (“[O]ne out of every 83 new jobs created economy-
wide in 2015 was in the solar industry.”). 
 4. In contrast to the traditional environmental justice focus on concentration 
of environmental harms in low-income communities, the focus of clean energy 
justice is on the concentrated accrual of environmental, economic, and 
participatory benefits to more affluent Americans, while others are left behind.  
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energy consumers to shoulder outsized costs.5 Take, for 
example, the case of Arizona, one of forty-four states to adopt 
“net metering,” a policy that lets those who install solar panels 
run their electricity meters backwards when they make more 
power than they can use.6 Net metering has helped make solar 
panels the “next granite countertop,” a desired accessory for 
affluent homebuyers.7 But the fact that net metering lowers 
these consumers’ bills means that those without solar panels 
pay proportionally more to support the electricity grid’s 
upkeep. A 2013 television spot aired in opposition to the policy 
draws upon this fact. The spot features a worried mother, with 
two children at the table behind her completing homework, 
who looks into the camera and explains: “Fairness—it’s 
something we value in Arizona. At a time when so many are 
struggling to pay their bills, it just doesn’t make sense to force 
hard-working families to cover the costs for people who choose 
to add solar panels.”8 In response to this campaign, Arizona 
regulators voted to impose additional monthly charges on solar 
customers and thereby slowed the growth of renewable energy 
in the state.9 
Was Arizona right to slow a successful clean energy 
program partly on the ground that affluent customers 
participated in greater numbers? State regulators and energy 
law scholars have recently begun to devote considerable 
attention to this question. Regulatory proceedings in dozens of 
 
 5. By defining the concerns I address here as “clean energy justice” concerns, 
I do not mean to limit the emerging field of clean energy justice to these 
distributive challenges alone, although I believe them to be a central problem of 
the field. Clean energy justice might also include concerns over any 
disproportionate impacts of siting “clean energy” facilities, questions of how to 
best empower low-income and minority communities to choose how and when to 
participate in clean energy, and a range of other concerns about the ways that 
clean energy touches (or fails to touch) low-income and minority communities.  
 6. See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE. § R14-2-1811 (2016); WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., 
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), RESIDENTIAL PROSUMERS—DRIVERS AND POLICY 
OPTIONS 77 (2014).  
 7. Justin Doom, Solar Panel Is Next Granite Countertop for Homebuilders, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2013, 10:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2013-09-10/solar-panel-is-next-granite-countertop-for-homebuilders 
[https://perma.cc/H2VF-HFMR].  
 8. Prosper.org, A Fair Solar Future, YOUTUBE (Aug. 23, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kpgXhQXgKGE [https://perma.cc/A79B-D8SA].  
 9. See Arizona Public Service Company’s Application for Approval of Net 
Metering Cost Shift Solution, 310 P.U.R.4th 121 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n 2013) 
[hereinafter AZ Net Metering Decision]; Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and 
Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 121 (2015). 
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states are considering the distributive effects of existing or 
proposed clean energy policies.10 At the same time, scholars 
have disputed the legitimacy of distributive concerns,11 
discussed the need to balance affordability and environmental 
concerns within public utility law,12 called for greater 
investment into renewable energy and energy efficiency in low-
income and minority communities,13 and more generally 
questioned the durability of electricity law’s current structure 
in a clean energy future.14 
To date, however, no one has offered sustained 
engagement with the questions of how electricity law has 
historically coped with distributional concerns, and how clean 
energy policies challenge the field’s long-standing practices in 
this regard. Perhaps the failure to engage deeply with the 
distributive justice arguments against clean energy stems from 
their sources. Utilities and libertarian advocacy groups 
advance the majority of these claims, raising questions about 
their underlying motivations.15 But the source of these 
 
 10. See infra Part III.  
 11. Rule, supra note 9, at 116 (cataloguing utility campaigns against net 
metering and questioning their use of “notoriously fuzzy” fairness arguments). 
 12. Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, A Triple Bottom Line for Electric 
Utility Regulation: Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental, and Consumer 
Protection Goals, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (2013). 
 13. See Deborah N. Behles, From Dirty to Green: Increasing Energy Efficiency 
and Renewable Energy in Environmental Justice Communities, 58 VILL. L. REV. 
25, 25 (2013) (arguing for increased “development of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency in environmental justice communities” as a matter of policy); Vien 
Troung, Addressing Poverty and Pollution: California’s SB 535 Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Fund, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 496 (2014) (describing effort to 
bring California’s cap-and-trade revenues to low-income communities).  
 14. See generally William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1614 (2014); Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: 
Removing Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712 
(2014); see also Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition 
Mean a Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2014); Michael P. 
Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive 
for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2012) (describing how 
utilities’ business model presents a barrier to reducing demand); Elias L. Quinn & 
Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network Architecture, Information 
Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 833, 839–41 
(2010) (describing the tensions that exist between regulated utilities and the 
smart grid agenda).  
 15. See Suzanne Goldenberg & Ed Pilkington, ALEC Calls for Penalties on 
“Freerider” Homeowners in Assault on Clean Energy, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/alec-freerider-homeowners-
assault-clean-energy [https://perma.cc/9KYP-MQBY] (explaining how “[a]n 
alliance of corporations and conservative activists is mobilizing to penalise 
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arguments must be analytically separated from the question of 
their legitimacy. 
This Article evaluates the distributive justice arguments 
against clean energy on their merits. It argues that there are 
real reasons to be concerned that many of our most popular 
clean energy policies will collectively help to create a new rift in 
America: one class that employs increasingly sophisticated 
gadgets to manage its energy use, save money, and gain an 
attendant sense of participation in collective problem-solving; 
and a second class that cannot afford such technologies and 
pays mounting electricity bills caused by the need to 
decarbonize the grid.16 But although it affirms the legitimacy 
of this challenge, the Article calls into question the cabined 
nature of the present debate over clean energy’s distributive 
consequences. 
Mainstream arguments highlight the immediate economic 
inequities of clean energy policies, charging that such 
disparities provide reason for halting the policies.17 But the 
idea that one could stem these inequities through slowing clean 
energy policies is rendered problematic by the complex 
inequities of climate change itself. Climate change will harm 
the poor first, worst, and longest—the poor of today, the poor of 
tomorrow, and the poor both domestically and 
internationally.18 To halt clean energy policies on distributive 
justice grounds is thus a more complicated equity tradeoff than 
many advocates would have regulators believe. 
This Article argues that electricity law provides a 
framework for a more nuanced approach to the question of how 
to manage clean energy’s justice challenges. Distributive 
justice concerns emerge in electricity law via long-standing 
debates over what role “equity” should play within the field.19 
 
homeowners who install their own solar panels”); see Editorial, The Koch Attack 
on Solar Energy, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/ 
opinion/sunday/the-koch-attack-on-solar-energy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8252-
LSB6] (documenting Koch Industries’ prominent role in challenges to state clean 
energy policies).  
 16. “Decarbonization” is the elimination of carbon emissions—the chief cause 
of climate change—from electricity production. Methods of decarbonization are 
discussed infra Part I.F.  
 17. Part III infra discusses four clean energy policies under particular assault 
on equity grounds: net metering, dynamic pricing, electric vehicle subsidies, and 
energy storage.   
 18. See infra Part III.A.  
 19. For this reason, throughout this Article I refer to the challenges raised 
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Over time, electricity law has toggled between, and drawn 
from, theories of both equity and efficiency. One line of 
argument, emphasizing equity—or “fairness”20—asserts that a 
central goal of electricity law should be to bring power even to 
those who struggle to afford it. The other predominant theory—
which rests on efficiency—argues that the aim of electricity law 
should be to price services according to their costs as precisely 
as possible, to provide the greatest overall welfare benefits.21 
Observing the fact that electricity law, in practice, fits neatly 
within neither of these frameworks, some scholars have 
suggested that “equity” is “the mother of all confusion” within 
electricity law.22 In contrast, this Article suggests that there is 
an underlying coherence to this dialectic: energy law’s central 
distributive norm is one of ensuring widespread access to 
affordable power. Achieving this aim has always required 
compromise between the two poles of efficiency and equity. 
And, as this Article traces, regulators have made just these 
 
against clean energy on distributional grounds as implicating “equity” concerns, 
by which I simply mean questions over how the benefits and burdens of the 
policies are allocated. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social 
Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 7 (2012) 
(defining equity as the consideration of “uneven impact of a program on different 
groups or individuals”).  
 20. See generally EDWARD E. ZAJAC, FAIRNESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING (1978) (arguing that public utility law 
is largely an ongoing contest between the aims of fairness and efficiency). See also 
BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL & MICHAEL H. DWORKIN, GLOBAL ENERGY JUSTICE: 
PROBLEMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES 5 (2014) (defining “an energy-just world 
as one that equitably shares both the benefits and burdens involved in the 
production and consumption of energy services” and that “involves the right of all 
to access energy services”). 
 21. For sources setting forth the tension between the two camps, see supra 
note 20; JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); 
CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 20 (3d ed. 1993); 
Harry M Trebing, Equity, Efficiency, and the Viability of Public Utility 
Regulation, in APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC UTILITY 
INDUSTRIES 17 (Werner Sichel & Thomas G. Gies eds., 1981); Richard A. Posner, 
Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 23 (1971) (elucidating 
the phenomenon of “internal subsidies,” which cuts against theories suggesting 
that regulation’s purpose is “to approximate the results of competition”); Jim 
Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in an Age of 
Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1235 
(1998) (explaining the inherent tension between providing aid to low-income 
customers and implementing competition).  
 22. W. ARTHUR LEWIS, OVERHEAD COSTS 47 (2003). This confusion stems 
from an inability to pinpoint the animating theory of electricity law—sometimes, 
it appears deeply efficiency focused; at other times, it seems to care primarily 
about distributive concerns. See infra Part II for more details on this dialectic.  
9. 88.3 WELTON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2017  7:27 PM 
578 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
sorts of compromises in both long-standing and more recent 
electricity law frameworks. 
Climate change complicates the regulatory commitment to 
widespread, affordable power. Experts widely agree that there 
is a need for rapid “decarbonization” of the electricity sector in 
order to effectively combat climate change and avoid dangerous 
levels of warming.23 To decarbonize, electricity regulators will 
have to build new legal frameworks that achieve high 
penetration of low- or no-carbon electricity generation, likely at 
considerable expense.24 Concordantly, they will have to grapple 
with the complicated question of how to preserve the field’s 
commitment to widespread, affordable electricity in a world 
where we now need to promote less electricity consumption.25 
This Article asserts that there is space within these 
changing aims to preserve a commitment to distributive justice 
 
 23. See James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: 
Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations, and 
Nature, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at 2 (finding that “there are already clear 
indications of undesirable impacts at the current level of warming and that 2°C 
warming would have major deleterious consequences”); SIR NICHOLAS STERN, 
STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 238 (2006) (noting that 
stabilization at any level of ultimate CO2 concentration will require reducing 
global emissions by approximately 80 percent); IPCC 2014, Summary for 
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 20 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds., 
2014) [hereinafter “WORKING GROUP III”] (“In the majority of low-stabilization 
scenarios, the share of low-carbon electricity supply . . . increases from the current 
share of approximately 30 percent to more than 80 percent by 2050, and fossil fuel 
power generation without [carbon capture and storage] is phased out almost 
entirely by 2100.”). 
 24. See RON BINZ ET AL., PRACTICING RISK-AWARE ELECTRICITY REGULATION: 
WHAT EVERY STATE REGULATOR NEEDS TO KNOW 5–6 (2012) (predicting that 
retail electricity prices will “rise sharply” in the next twenty years due to the level 
of investment needed in the U.S. electricity sector); see also JAMES H. WILLIAMS 
ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 24 (2014) 
(estimating the median price of cutting carbon dioxide emissions 80 percent from 
1990 levels by 2050 to be between $160 billion and $560 billion). 
 25. As a theoretical matter, decreased consumption of electricity might not be 
necessary if we could convert electricity generation to 100 percent renewable 
energy. But as a practical matter, given the likely expense and only partial 
accomplishment of this aim, decreasing consumption is likely to remain a critical 
decarbonization strategy for the foreseeable future. See Kate Galbraith, McKinsey 
Report Cites $1.2 Trillion in Potential Savings from Energy Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES 
GREEN BLOG (July 29, 2009), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/29/ 
mckinsey-report-cites-12-trillion-in-potential-savings-from-energy-efficiency/ 
[http://perma.cc/T76E-3CLA] (summarizing a report that estimates that the 
United States could save $1.2 trillion through 2020 by investing in cost-effective 
energy-efficiency options). 
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that accords with electricity law’s long tradition of ensuring 
access and affordability, even while pursuing decarbonization 
policies. After all, electrification was never valued as an end in 
itself.26 Access is important because of the worlds that 
electricity opens up: relief from backbreaking farm and factory 
labor;27 light to read by in the evenings, and a radio to connect 
to politics and culture;28 expanded markets for new 
appliances;29 “[c]omfort, cold beer, and warm homes”;30 and 
more recently, computers, cell phones, and the Internet. 
Expanding grid access and ensuring low rates were 
twentieth-century mechanisms for achieving these economic 
and social benefits of electrifying America.31 Now, climate 
change requires a turn away from universal promotion of 
increased electricity consumption as a driver of economic 
growth and civic participation.32 Regulators embracing the 
imperative to decarbonize have increasingly turned towards 
the strategy of creating a “participatory” grid.33 In a 
participatory grid, pricing signals and incentives will motivate 
 
 26. See JENNIE C. STEPHENS, ELIZABETH J. WILSON & TARLA RAI PETERSON, 
SMART GRID (R)EVOLUTION: ELECTRIC POWER STRUGGLES 78 (2015) (“People use 
energy to do things; having access to electricity is not an end in itself.”); David B. 
Spence, Regulation, “Republican Moments,” and Energy Policy Reform, B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1561, 1580 (2011) (“It is not oil or gas or electricity that we really want: 
rather, it is the services that they provide.”). 
 27. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE PATH TO POWER 516–17 (1982); DAVID NYE, 
ELECTRIFYING AMERICA 185–235 (1998).  
 28. See CARO, supra note 27, at 514–15; see also THE NEXT GREATEST THING 
110–17 (Richard A. Pence ed., 1984) (describing the educational, cultural, and 
economic value of radio to newly electrified rural households). 
 29. See generally Gregory B. Field, “Electricity for All:” The Electric Home and 
Farm Authority and the Politics of Mass Consumption, 1932–1935, 64 BUS. HIST. 
REV. 32 (1990); NYE, supra note 27, at 238–39.  
 30. Linda Kanamine, Iowa Revolution: Town of Energy Pioneers, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 22, 1992, at 8A (quoting a utility executive regarding what they really sell).  
 31. See infra Parts II.A–B.  
 32. See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 119 (2003) (describing the twentieth century 
belief that Americans “simultaneously fulfilled personal desire and civic 
obligation by consuming”); see also Lorie Higgins & Loren Lutzenhiser, 
Ceremonial Equity: Low-Income Energy Assistance and the Failure of Socio-
Environmental Policy, 42 SOC. PROB. 468, 471 (1995) (criticizing the U.S. approach 
to energy equity as belonging to the “recurrent theme in U.S. political culture” 
that “substitute[s] . . . economic opportunity and growth for redistributional 
equity”). 
 33. See, e.g., Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming 
the Energy Vision, 319 P.U.R.4th 1, 3 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 26, 2015) 
(order) [hereinafter N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order]; see infra Part II for additional 
examples. 
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consumers to change their patterns of energy consumption in 
order to alleviate climate change, through technologies like 
“smart” thermostats, solar panels, energy storage devices, and 
electric vehicles.34 These kinds of participatory technologies 
will allow consumers to use power when it is cheapest, and to 
supply power back to the grid when it is most expensive, 
thereby maintaining affordability. Such participation offers 
underappreciated psychological benefits as well: through 
participating in the project of decarbonization, consumers may 
find a partial salve against feelings of helplessness and 
vulnerability produced by climate change, and gain a sense of 
engagement in a project larger than themselves.35 
The participatory grid vision has important parallels to the 
twentieth-century challenge of electrification. Access to 
affordable power allowed twentieth-century consumers to 
flourish in society. Grid participation will be required to 
provide twenty-first century consumers the affordable 
electricity necessary to do the same. From this parallel between 
regulatory eras flows this Article’s central conclusion: if grid 
participation is to become the means of affordable energy and a 
significant mode of civic engagement with respect to climate 
change, then electricity law’s longstanding equity commitment 
counsels for a concerted effort to widen the class of Americans 
able to become a part of the participatory grid. The project of 
electrification was the twentieth-century response to the 
challenge of energy justice. In the coming decades, the 
challenge of clean energy justice will require a project of clean 
electrification, to broaden access not to the grid itself but to the 
technologies necessary to be a successful twenty-first century 
grid participant. 
Lawmakers might work to broaden grid participation 
through a range of programs and strategies. Because states 
maintain jurisdiction over the interactions between energy 
suppliers and consumers,36 much of the potential for reform 
exists at the state level. I suggest several prominent debates in 
state public utility law where clean electrification norms might 
play an important role: the continuing evolution of electricity 
law’s core mandate to ensure “just and reasonable” rates; the 
 
 34. See infra Part I for a more detailed discussion of these technologies and 
the policies motivating their uptake.  
 35. See infra Part III.B.  
 36. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).  
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question of how to manage the wealth of new data produced by 
the smart grid; and conversations about the role of utilities in 
the participatory grid of the future. I also discuss the ways in 
which public utility law cannot fully accomplish clean 
electrification, just as it proved unable to single-handedly 
electrify America last century. Finally, I call into question the 
individualistic notion of “participation” that prevailing versions 
of the participatory grid embody. The history of electrification 
counsels that our most successful grid experiments in terms of 
equity and empowerment may come from focusing on more 
collective forms of grid participation.37 Thus, regulators might 
pay particular attention to programs like community solar and 
micro-grid formation for the community-scale participation 
that they embody. 
We stand at an important juncture for gaining a deeper 
understanding of electricity law’s approach to distributive 
justice. State clean energy efforts are likely to dominate 
domestic climate change policy for the foreseeable future, 
particularly given the Trump administration’s hostility to 
federal climate regulation.38 Relatedly, many states are 
considering radically restructuring their energy governance to 
meet the challenge of decarbonization.39 As they move toward a 
participatory grid, states may call on utilities to perform a 
significantly different role this century than they did in the 
previous century. These shifts present major opportunities for 
re-envisioning the role that equity plays within the electricity 
system, and for adapting enduring norms to meet the 
challenges ahead. Updating discussions of energy law’s 
historical equity norms for the present era is thus a matter of 
both scholarly and practical importance. 
This Article develops the argument for clean electrification 
in five parts. Part I looks at how equity concerns factor into 
current clean energy debates, focusing on four policies that 
have received the most attention on these grounds: net 
metering, dynamic pricing, energy storage, and electric vehicle 
infrastructure. Part II turns to examine electricity law’s 
historical commitment to equity, tracing the forms this 
 
 37. Thanks to William Boyd for encouraging this line of thinking.  
 38. See Kimberley A. Strassel, Scott Pruitt’s Back-to-Basics Agenda for the 
EPA, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-pruitts-back-
to-basics-agenda-for-the-epa-1487375872 [https://perma.cc/KJK8-QXUV]. 
 39. See infra Part II.A. 
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commitment has taken over time. Part III discusses the ways 
in which climate change and its disparate burdens present new 
challenges for understanding equity within electricity law. It 
argues that the best way to synthesize energy law’s equity 
commitment and climate change’s many inequities is to pursue 
clean electrification: a broadening of the range of Americans 
able to take advantage of the participatory grid. Part IV begins 
the process of imagining how clean electrification might 
proceed, considering the promise and limits of public utility law 
in achieving clean energy justice. Part V briefly concludes by 
considering the politics of clean electrification. 
I.  THE PARTICIPATORY GRID AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Across the country, states are tackling climate change in a 
range of ways. In part, states are using broad mandates,40 
economy-wide solutions like cap-and-trade programs,41 and 
experiments with large-scale, carbon-free generation.42 But 
 
 40. The most popular clean energy mandate is a “Renewable Portfolio 
Standard” (RPS). Twenty-eight states utilize RPS policies, which require utilities 
to obtain an annually increasing percentage of their power from renewable 
sources. Similarly, twenty-six have Energy Efficiency Resource Standards 
(EERS), which require utilities to achieve certain energy savings targets. See NC 
Clean Energy Tech. Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Policies, DSIRE (2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/78XT-
RQQT]; NC Clean Energy Tech. Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Efficiency 
Resource Standards, DSIRE (and Goals) (Mar. 2015), http://ncsolarcen-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-
Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9PW-NE2M].  
 41. Ten states currently have cap-and-trade programs, which establish caps 
on the amount of carbon dioxide that covered sources can emit and permit trading 
of emissions permits among the sources. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95801 
(2016) (establishing a greenhouse gas cap and trade program for California); 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/K7WZ-BE9G] (explaining the carbon dioxide cap-and-
trade program covering nine northeastern states). As numerous scholars have 
documented, these cap-and-trade programs, if not well designed, raise equity 
concerns of their own. Because these impacts are well explored elsewhere, this 
Article does not focus on them. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 19; Tracey M. Roberts, 
Mitigating the Distributional Impacts of Climate Change Policy, 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 209, 209 (2010); Vien Truong, Addressing Poverty and Pollution: 
California’s SB 535 Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
493, 520 (2014).  
 42. See William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking 
and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 844–54 (2016) 
(describing state experiments with financing the construction of new nuclear 
energy generation and carbon capture and storage facilities). 
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increasingly, as either a complementary or an alternative 
solution,43 states are more directly mediating the relationship 
between consumers and electricity, seeking to prompt more 
active grid participation on the part of consumers.44 And they 
are doing so in ways that raise a host of new equity problems 
by threatening electricity law’s long commitment to cheap 
power for all. 
This Part focuses on four popular state-level clean energy 
policies often criticized on equity grounds: net metering, 
dynamic pricing, energy storage, and electric vehicle 
infrastructure.45 It directs its focus to these state policies 
because such state energy laws are where most U.S. climate 
change policy is playing out.46 Many scholars have weighed in 
on why states are surprisingly active on climate change given 
the collective action problems it raises, and this Article will not 
retrace those steps.47 For present purposes, it suffices to note 
 
 43. Even where cap-and-trade programs exist, they “may not be sufficient to 
achieve ambitious near- and long-term emissions reduction targets,” such that 
“[c]omplementary strategies are probably needed and certainly advisable.” 
Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to 
Rapidly Reduce U.S. Carbon Emissions, 106 PNAS 18452, 18452 (2009); Ann E. 
Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary 
Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 207 (2012) (exploring issues of 
complementarity and competition between economy-wide carbon policies and 
more targeted strategies).  
 44. See infra Part I.A for a more detailed explication of this vision.  
 45. Notably absent from this list is energy efficiency policy, largely because 
programs to distribute energy efficiency more equitably have long existed, 
although in far from ideal form. See infra notes 233–235 and accompanying text. 
Also absent from this list is federal and state tax policy. Because this Article 
focuses on theories, history, and avenues for reform within energy law, it leaves 
tax policy to the side. Nevertheless, as others have observed, tax policy certainly 
compounds many of clean energy’s equity challenges, as tax credits for clean 
energy predominantly go to the wealthy. See Severin Borenstein & Lucas W. 
Davis, The Distributional Effects of U.S. Clean Energy Tax Credits, 30 U. CHI. 
PRESS 191 (2016); U.C. Berkeley Energy Institute at Haas Working Paper No. 
262, July 2015. Further examination of how tax policies and energy policies 
interact—and have potentially compounding inequities—would be a useful 
intervention. 
 46. I do not want to understate the importance of federal financial support for 
clean energy projects, particularly the importance of tax credits: “Between 2009 
and 2014, the federal government will have spent more than $150 billion in clean 
energy projects through direct lending, tax expenditures, and loan guarantees.” 
KEN BERLIN ET AL., STATE CLEAN ENERGY FINANCE BANKS: NEW INVESTMENT 
FACILITIES FOR CLEAN ENERGY DEPLOYMENT 5 (Sept. 2012). However, federal 
government spending has been declining as programs created under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act expire, see id., making states increasingly 
important loci of climate policy in the coming years.  
 47. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental 
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that states have stepped in to fill what has largely been a void 
in federal and international clean energy policies over the past 
two decades, and every state in the country has some clean 
energy policies in place.48 Although the Obama administration 
took significant steps to federalize climate policy, state efforts 
are likely to again return to the fore under the Trump 
administration.49 As these initiatives grow, so will the equity 
concerns that they raise. 
A. The Participatory Grid 
1. The Vision in Leading States 
Before turning to the equity challenges raised against 
particular policies, it is helpful to begin with a broader picture 
of the vision that regulators have for transforming passive 
 
Leadership: California’s Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 63–64 
(2013); Brandon Hofmeister, Roles for State Energy Regulators in Climate Change 
Mitigation, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 67, 67 (2012); Vivian E. Thomson & 
Vicki Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism: Climate Change 
Policymaking and the States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2011); Hari M. Osofsky, 
Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and 
Cities at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 64 (2010); Richard B. Stewart, States and 
Cities As Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 681 (2008). 
 48. See DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY, 
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RR5K-5EL5].  
 49. See supra note 38. If the Obama administration’s signature climate 
regulation, the Clean Power Plan, remains intact, it too is likely to spurn further 
state participatory grid strategies. The Clean Power Plan requires states to 
develop plans for achieving mandated levels of emissions reductions from existing 
power plants, but allows considerable flexibility as to how states achieve these 
reductions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (giving states authority to design their 
own implementation plans subject to EPA approval); EPA Rule, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 
(2015). [hereinafter EPA Final Rule]. However, the fate of the Clean Power Plan 
remains uncertain: in February 2016, the Supreme Court stayed implementation 
of the Clean Power Plan during the pendency of a suit against it in the D.C. 
Circuit. See North Dakota v. EPA, 136 U.S. 999 (Feb. 9, 2016) (order granting 
stay); see also EPA Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan: Key Changes and 
Improvements 3, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-
cpp-key-changes.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/K2TF-9G77] 
(“EPA . . . anticipates that, due to its low costs and potential in every state, 
demand-side [energy efficiency] will be a significant component of state plans 
under the Clean Power Plan.”); U.S. Unveils Measures to Encourage Solar Power 
Use, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.seia.org/news/ 
us-unveils-measures-encourage-solar-power-use [https://perma.cc/87JL-8SWZ] 
(explaining how the Clean Power Plan “provides strong incentives” for the 
development of solar power).  
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“ratepayers” into active “participants” in the fight against 
climate change. The following two subparts aim to paint—and 
then complicate—this vision. This subpart describes how 
leading states are working to make the grid “participatory.” 
Part I.A.2 then interrogates the extent to which this new grid 
can really be considered “participatory,” acknowledging the 
ways in which grid “participation” demands less robust 
engagement than traditional political participation. 
Several states make up the vanguard of efforts to create a 
more participatory grid, including New York, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Hawaii, Maryland, and California. In these states, 
regulatory commissions or their consultants have put forth 
vision statements describing the shape they want electricity 
markets and the electricity grid to take—all of which center on 
inducing greater customer participation. New York, for 
example, recognizing the “enormous and largely untapped 
resource” of the “customer side of the grid,” is holding a 
regulatory proceeding to establish new markets in which 
customers become “active participants.”50 Similarly, 
Massachusetts’ regulatory commission issued a 2014 order 
“launch[ing] a new energy future for Massachusetts . . . [that] 
will empower customers to manage and reduce their energy 
costs.”51 Minnesota is in the midst of a proceeding to create a 
grid that “enables customers to manage and potentially reduce 
their energy costs.”52 In California, a 2013 Commission White 
Paper asserted that “[c]ustomer participation, more than the 
actions of the utilities or of the regulators, is critical to meet 
California’s greenhouse gas emission goals in a cost-effective 
manner.”53  Since this time, California’s regulatory commission 
 
 50. N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 7. 
 51. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Util., Investigation by the Department of Public 
Utilities on its Own Motion into Modernization of the Electric Grid, D.P.U. 12-76-
B (June 12, 2014), http://web1.env.state.ma.us/DPU/FileRoomAPI/api/ 
Attachments/Get/?path=12-76%2FOrder_1276B.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB2D-2X8Y] 
(order). 
 52. See Nancy Lange et al., Building a Minnesota Conversation on Grid 
Modernization with a Focus on Distribution Systems, Presentation, MINN. PUB. 
UTIL. COMM’N (May 12, 2015), http://mn.gov/puc/documents/pdf_files/grid 
_modernization_5-12-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RN5-QNXC]; see also Haw. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n, Exhibit A: Commission White Paper: Commission’s Inclinations on 
the Future of Hawaii’s Electric Utilities, PUC.HAWAII.GOV (2014), 
http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Commissions-Inclinations.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/K4U3-SYDD]. 
 53. KRISTIN RALFF DOUGLAS & MARZIA ZAFAR, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 
POLICY AND PLANNING DIV., CUSTOMERS AS GRID PARTICIPANTS: A 
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has launched several proceedings aimed at engaging customers 
as “partners” in grid decarbonization.54 
What will the new participatory grid look like? Its shape 
remains fuzzy, as vision still largely exceeds technological 
capacity.55 Nevertheless, a few elements seem clear. “Con”-
sumers of energy are becoming “pro”-sumers, not only 
purchasing energy but also generating electricity through 
onsite “distributed generation,” largely in the form of rooftop 
solar panels.56 A “smart grid” will better balance electricity 
supply and demand by modernizing outdated infrastructure 
and providing customers with new energy management tools.57 
Chief among these tools are “smart meters,” which record 
time-specific energy usage data and enable two-way 
communications between utilities and customers.58 Smart 
meters provide huge amounts of new data about energy 
consumption59 and allow electricity pricing to better reflect 
production costs.60 Such pricing reforms—particularly when 
coupled with rising rates—might incentivize customers to 
adopt a range of new technologies, including communicative 
thermostats, appliances capable of automated control, and 
electric vehicles.61 These technologies could also allow utilities 
 
FUNDAMENTALLY NEW ROLE FOR CUSTOMERS 3 (2015).  
 54. See id.; see also Proposed Decision on Order Instituting Rulemaking on 
the Commission’s Own Motion to Conduct a Comprehensive Examination of 
Investor Owned Electric Utilities’ Residential Rate Structures, the Transition to 
Time Varying and Dynamic Rates, and Other Statutory Obligations, R. 12-06-013 
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Apr. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n 
Proposed Decision]. 
 55. Andre Begosso et al., Retail Resurgence, 148 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 42, 43 
(2010).  
 56. See IEA, supra note 6, at 5–6; Sharon B. Jacobs, Consumer Generation, 
ECOLOGY L. Q. (forthcoming 2016).  
 57. See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 
37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013); Quinn & Reed, supra note 14.  
 58. See Eisen, supra note 57, at 10–11; EDISON ELEC. INST., UTILITY-SCALE 
SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS 1 (2014).  
 59. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Energy Consumption Data: 
The Key to Improved Energy Efficiency, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69, 
74 (2015).  
 60. Paul L. Joskow & Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 
102 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 382 (2012).  
 61. See, e.g., ENERGY FUTURE COAL., UTILITY 2.0: PILOTING THE FUTURE FOR 
MARYLAND’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND THEIR CUSTOMERS 10 (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/Berliner/Resources/Files/efc_full_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5THZ-HULF]; Klass & Wilson, supra note 59, at 75 (describing 
how advanced metering allows for “set and forget” commands that program “air 
conditioners, water heaters, or refrigerators . . . to automatically cycle in response 
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to more actively control customer load during peak periods in 
exchange for incentive payments.62 Other consumers might 
exit the grid entirely by backing up their distributed 
generation with on-site energy storage to fulfill all their energy 
needs.63 
In some states, the role of utilities in this new system 
might be radically different. New York’s Public Service 
Commission, for example, has begun a proceeding dedicated to 
“Reforming the Energy Vision,” under which utilities will 
become “Distributed System Platform providers” that facilitate 
and coordinate consumer offerings to the grid.64 Under this 
model, utilities’ primary job will be to create a platform where 
consumers can bid into a central market any local generation 
(such as excess energy from rooftop solar), energy storage 
potential, or ability to cut demand for which they would like to 
receive payment. The utility’s job will then be to organize and 
deploy all cost-effective consumer-side offerings.65 Once 
systems like this are in place, an urban dweller might buy not 
only her produce but also her electricity from a trusted farmer 
down the road.66 
Outside of this leading group of states, regulators are less 
 
to system signals or pre-set price points.”); Stephanie M. Stern, Smart-Grid: 
Technology and the Psychology of Environmental Behavior Change, 86 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 139, 140 (2011) (describing a potential future in which imploring behavior 
change is abandoned “in favor of sophisticated default- and preference-setting and 
integrated external control of residential electricity.”). 
 62. Cf. AHMAD FARUQUI, RYAN HLEDIK & JENNIFER PALMER, REGULATORY 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT & BRATTLE GRP. GLOB., TIME-VARYING AND DYNAMIC RATE 
DESIGN 6 (2012), http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-
faruquihledikpalmer-timevaryingdynamicratedesign-2012-jul-23.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E7EV-HWQK] (arguing that the real promise of dynamic pricing 
lies in the ability of system operators to run an improved system rather than in 
individualized consumer responses to price fluctuations). 
 63. On-site energy storage would likely take the form of batteries capable of 
storing energy during times of over-supply and releasing that energy for 
consumption during times of high demand. See PETER BRONSKI ET AL., THE 
ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION: WHEN AND WHERE DISTRIBUTED SOLAR 
GENERATION PLUS STORAGE COMPETES WITH TRADITIONAL UTILITY SERVICE 6 
(2014).  
 64. N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 2.  
 65. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the 
Energy Vision, 329 P.U.R.4th 1, 37–39, 41–42 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, May 19, 
2016) (order).  
 66. See Matthew Crosby, An Airbnb or Uber for the Electricity Grid?, RMI 
BLOG (Sept. 2, 2014), http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2014_09_02_an_airbnb_or_uber_for_ 
the_electricity_grid [https://perma.cc/QHX5-89CA]; see also Eisen, supra note 14 
(laying out a proposal for FERC to create a nationwide platform of this sort).   
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likely to articulate this kind of comprehensive vision of a 
participatory, consumer-centric grid. And in all states, it 
remains the case that significant investments in new, large-
scale infrastructure will be critical in the clean energy 
transition.67 Nevertheless, all states have in place at least 
some policies aimed at inducing consumers to more actively 
participate in their energy management, with net metering and 
energy efficiency policies being the most widespread.68 States 
where the electricity industry remains “vertically integrated,” 
such that the same company owns and manages generation, 
transmission, and distribution under public utility commission 
oversight, may be less inclined to adopt a full-throated version 
of the participatory grid than their counterparts that have 
more fully opened their electricity sectors up to competition.69 
But these reforms are penetrating even many states with more 
traditional regulatory structures,70 suggesting that the 
participatory grid may be a change poised to sweep the nation. 
 
 67. Necessary upgrades just to the U.S. transmission and distribution grid 
are estimated to be in the range of $50 billion per year over the next two decades. 
See CHRIS NEME & RICH SEDANO, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, US 
EXPERIENCE WITH EFFICIENCY AS A TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
RESOURCE i (2014), http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-
neme-efficiencyasatanddresource-2012-feb-14.pdf.  [https://perma.cc/SBU9-
H3SD]. Any money that states choose to spend on pursuing new nuclear power, 
carbon capture and storage, or utility-scale renewable energy is additional to this 
basic infrastructure spending. 
 68. See, e.g., DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES AND 
EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2015) [https://perma.cc/ 
Y6EZ-XUVQ].  
 69. For a thorough description of the different state models of utility 
regulation in the United States, see Boyd & Carlson, supra note 42, at 835–39. 
Frank Wolak does a good job describing why restructured states might find 
demand-side management—i.e., participatory grid solutions—particularly 
important, as their market prices will benefit from the increased competition that 
low-cost, demand-side solutions provide. See Frank A. Wolak, Regulating 
Competition in Wholesale Electricity Supply, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH (Nancy Rose ed., 2014), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12567.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WYM6-8JVS]. In traditional, vertically integrated states, where 
generation costs are bundled into overall rates, generation pricing is less visible 
and less subject to market manipulation, creating less pressure on regulators to 
implement demand-side solutions. See id. at 210–11.  
 70. Minnesota, California, and Hawaii, for example, retain traditionally 
regulated retail sectors but are considering or implementing sweeping reforms 
along the lines of a participatory grid. See supra note 52.  
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2. Is This Really Participation? 
There are at least two reasons one might be skeptical of 
the participatory grid vision. The first is practical: it is not 
clear that overextended Americans want to invest more time in 
redesigning their electricity systems or interfacing with their 
utility companies. This concern is legitimate, but is addressed 
to a certain extent by the vision itself: in speaking of 
“participation,” regulators do not intend to actively engage 
consumers on an hour-to-hour basis, such that they continually 
rejigger their electricity consumption in response to changing 
prices. Instead, much of this system is likely to be automated: 
smart thermostats will send automatic signals to household 
appliances indicating when they should shut off and on, based 
on pricing data, and utilities might be granted remote control 
over certain consumer-side functions (such as cycling air 
conditioners off and on) in exchange for incentive payments.71 
And much of the coordination of these tasks might occur not at 
the consumer level, but instead at the “aggregator” level—that 
is, third parties who construct a business model on the ability 
to contract with consumers to manage their energy supply.72 
The participatory grid is thus participatory only in the 
sense that consumer-side offerings will become a standard 
component of the larger grid and electricity marketplace, and 
participating consumers will reap the attendant financial 
benefits and the psychological satisfaction of knowing that they 
are contributing to a cleaner energy system. This conception of 
participation is likely to be pragmatically achievable. But it 
creates a second potential problem by narrowing the concept of 
the term “participation” as it is commonly understood in our 
democratic tradition.73 The new vision for the grid is not one in 
which citizens come together, deliberate their energy 
 
 71. See supra note 61. 
 72. Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority Over 
Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69, 76 (2013) (explaining the role and expertise of 
aggregators). 
 73. Contrast this vision with, for example, Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, 
Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING 
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY 
GOVERNANCE 5 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003) (calling for “active 
political involvement of the citizenry” and “political consensus through dialogue”); 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (similar). 
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preferences, and settle upon forms of collective action to 
promote decarbonization. Instead, the vision focuses 
specifically on individuals as consumers, and capitalizes on the 
desire to save money as the primary impetus for grid 
participation.74 Moreover, the model does not even ask 
consumers to exert much effort in the market domain, given 
the automation expected to dominate the process. 
There are compelling reasons for regulators to promote 
this type of participation. Individuals contribute approximately 
one-third of all carbon dioxide emissions in the United States, 
amounting to roughly eight percent of the world’s total 
emissions.75 Incentivizing individual behavioral changes may 
therefore be important in the fight against climate change.76 
And financially incentivizing (automated) right action on 
climate change may be particularly important. It is hard to 
instill an ethic that turning on a light, or driving to visit a 
friend, is “wrong” per se,77 even though these small actions 
collectively create much of the problem. Financial incentives 
and technological fixes help eliminate the need for difficult 
appeals to conscience. Additionally, a model that relies on 
consumer incentives avoids some of climate change’s political 
challenges. In place of moral appeals, a consumer-based model 
allows even climate skeptics to choose to adopt participatory 
grid technologies purely for their cost-saving potential.78 
But a focus on this narrow, market-centric version of 
participation also has downsides. Many scholars believe that 
“people hold and express different preferences in their 
 
 74. Cf. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product 
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 527 
(2004) (“For better or worse . . . the market and the consumer are central to public 
policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century.”). 
 75. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral 
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1672, 1677 (2007); Dietz et al., supra note 43, at 
18452 (finding that behavioral changes could cut “20% of household direct 
emissions or 7.4% of US national emissions, with little or no reduction in 
household well-being”).  
 76. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 75, at 1675. 
 77. See DALE JAMIESON, REASON IN A DARK TIME: WHY THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGES FAILED—AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR FUTURE 7 
(2014) (“Even most of us who care deeply about climate change would have to 
admit . . . that we do not feel like killers when we fly or drive.”).  
 78. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 
118, 145 (2007) (advocating “expressive overdetermination” in laws and policies, 
which makes them susceptible to multiple cultural interpretations and thereby 
enhances their appeal).  
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‘consumer’ role and in their ‘citizen’ role,”79 and may act more 
benevolently in their role as citizens than as consumers.80 If 
this is true, then a participatory grid focused largely on 
empowering consumers qua consumers—and with as little 
personal effort as possible—may miss opportunities for 
engaging Americans in the struggle against climate change in 
more meaningful and impactful ways.81 
I find this critique of the dominant participatory grid 
vision compelling, and will return to discuss it further in Part 
IV of this Article. For now, however, I want to set it aside and 
focus specifically on the participatory grid’s equity problem—
that is, on distributional disparities in the ability of Americans 
to become a part of the vision as it exists now. The remainder 
of this section explores in detail the equity implications of 
several of the most prevalent participatory grid policies: net 
metering, smart meters and dynamic pricing, and the 
promotion of electric vehicle infrastructure and energy storage. 
Collectively, these policies—widely celebrated as promising 
approaches to achieving clean energy82—risk creating a new 
problem of clean energy justice. 
 
 79. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and 
the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 378 (1998)  
 80. See id. at 378–79 (discussing the various scholars who make this 
assertion); Kysar, supra note 74, at 636 (same). 
 81. Cf. Benjamin R. Barber, A Failure of Democracy, Not Capitalism, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 29, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/29/opinion/a-failure-of-
democracy-not-capitalism.html [https://perma.cc/D323-SDVQ] (arguing that “we 
have diminished the power of the public sphere” in favor of “a private liberty that 
allows us to work and prosper individually”); SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, FIRST AS TRAGEDY, 
THEN AS FARCE 34, 52 (2009) (expressing skepticism about “cultural capitalism,” 
wherein “the capitalist mobilization of a society’s productive capacity can also be 
made to serve ecological goals, the struggle against poverty, and other worthy 
ends”). But see Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 75, at 1723  (arguing that 
it is “equally likely” that individuals who undertake market actions to reduce 
carbon “will become more supportive of government regulation”).  
 82. See generally Priya Barua, Letha Tawney & Lutz Weischer, Delivering on 
the Green Economy: The Role of Policy in Developing Successful Domestic Solar 
and Wind Industries (World. Res. Inst., Working Paper 2012),  
http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/delivering_clean_energy_economy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RC5-WQPF]; Severin Borenstein, Michael Jaske & Arthur 
Rosenfeld, Dynamic Pricing, Advanced Metering, and Demand Response in 
Electricity Markets (Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts., Working Paper 105, 2002), 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/11w8d6m4 [https://perma.cc/4ZS7-APHA]; PAUL 
DENHOLM ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, THE ROLE OF ENERGY 
STORAGE WITH RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY GENERATION (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47187.pdf  [https://perma.cc/59ZT-EEUM].  
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B. Net Metering 
The rooftop solar panel might seem to beautifully evoke 
the American ideal of self-sufficiency. In reality, solar panels 
have required substantial policy and grid support to become 
viable in most places.83 As noted earlier, forty-four states and 
the District of Columbia use net metering to foster solar panel 
growth.84 This policy allows customers to draw power from the 
grid when necessary, while permitting them to sell their solar 
power into the grid when their home produces excess power.85 
The “net” aspect of the policy comes from the fact that the 
transactions are monitored by a single meter, which counts 
upwards when the consumer is drawing in grid power, and 
back downwards when the consumer is providing power to the 
grid. Net metering’s popularity is largely due to its simplicity. 
Customers easily understand the concept of “running the meter 
backwards,” and the policy avoids federal-state jurisdictional 
complications that exist at the intersection of wholesale and 
retail power.86 Net metering is also effective: because it makes 
investment in solar panels pay off relatively quickly, it has 
been one of the key policy drivers of the recent solar “boom.”87 
But in recent years, opponents have launched a nationwide 
assault on the policy,88 which has gained particular traction in 
 
 83. See LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, REGULATORY 
CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXPANDED ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED 
SOLAR 3 (Nov. 2013) (cataloguing the range of support policies for solar energy).  
 84. See text accompanying supra note 6. 
 85. See id.  
 86. See Steven Ferrey, Nothing but Net: Renewable Energy and the 
Environment, Midamerican Legal Fictions, and Supremacy Doctrine, 14 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2003) (describing how the “state/federal struggle over 
net metering replays seventy years of federalism’s jurisdictional friction regarding 
electric power development”). 
 87. Solar production has doubled annually every year since 2009, and in 
leading states like California and Hawaii, it has climbed to one or two percent of 
overall energy. However, it remains less than 0.1 percent of the energy mix in a 
majority of states (31). See Solar Energy Industries Association Fact Sheet,  “Net 
Metering By State” (Nov. 2012), http://www.seia.org/research-resources/net-
metering-state [https://perma.cc/A6S3-BXBA]. At the end of 2012, 99 percent of 
installed solar PV was on net metering tariffs. BIRD ET AL., supra note 83, at 33.  
 88. One 2016 study found that “[i]n 2015, regulators, lawmakers, or utilities 
in at least forty-six states studied, proposed, or enacted policy changes pertaining 
to net metering, valuation of distributed solar, fixed or solar charges, third-party 
or utility-led rooftop solar ownership, or community solar . . .”. Twenty-seven 
states specifically considered or enacted changes to net metering in 2015. N.C. 
CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CENTER, 2015 POLICY REVIEW Q4 REPORT, 50 
STATES OF SOLAR, 11, 14 (Feb. 2016), https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp-
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content/uploads/ 50sosQ4-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXJ5-GCYJ]. Regarding 
specific state debates, see, for example, Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for 
Utilities, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/ 
business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-fresh-threat-do-it-yourself-
power.html [https://perma.cc/X553-EM57] (detailing Arizona’s and California’s 
debates in particular); Thomas Content, Green-power, Low-Energy Users Get 
Brunt of Utility Rate Increase, MILWAUKEE-WISCONSIN J. SENTINEL (Jan 5, 2013), 
http://archive.jsonline.com/business/greenpower-lowenergy-users-get-brunt-of-
utility-rate-increase-6e88n4n-185771321.html [https://perma.cc/MDZ7-N3MK] 
(reporting that Wisconsin commission approved a twenty percent increase in the 
fixed portion of utility rates); Donna Bryson, Contentious Solar Energy Issue 
Raised in Colorado, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2014), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/12/contentious-solar-energy-
issue-raised-in-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/89ZJ-4AR7]; In the matter of the 
Application of Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. for Approval of Its 2014 Renewable Energy 
Standard Compliance Plan, 13A-0836E, 2015 WL 7424163 (Colo. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n Nov. 10, 2015); Cathy Proctor, Xcel Energy and Solar Power Backers 





Press Release, Hawaiian Electric, Hawaiian Electric Companies Propose Plan to 
Sustainably Increase Rooftop Solar (Jan. 20, 2015) (on file with author) (proposing 
to reduce amount paid to new solar customers); Passera Laurel, Idaho PSC 
Improves Net Metering Rules of Idaho Power, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
COUNCIL: NEWS (July 10, 2013), http://www.irecusa.org/2013/07/idaho-psc-
improves-net-metering-rules-for-idaho-power/ [https://perma.cc/JHE8-5DVK]; 
Karen Uhlenhuth, In Defeat for ALEC, Kansas Lawmakers Pass Net Metering 
Plan, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Apr. 7, 2014), http://midwestenergynews.com/ 
2014/04/07/in-defeat-for-alec-kansas-lawmakers-pass-net-metering-plan/ 
[https://perma.cc/B8Y9-Z4RN]; Examination of the Comprehensive Costs and 
Benefits of Net Metering in Louisiana No. X-33192 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Mar. 
28, 2014); Order Approving Distributed Solar Value Methodology, No. E999/M-14-
65 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Apr. 1, 2014); Order Granting Rehearing in Part, 
Establishing Transition Plan, and Making Other Findings, Nos. 14-E-0151 & 14-
E-0422 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 17, 2015); Sean Whaley, Review Proposed 
for Rates of Homeowners Who Install Solar Systems, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (June 16, 
2014), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/review-proposed-rates-homeowners-
who-install-solar-systems [https://perma.cc/AWF8-3FBE]; Paul Monies, Oklahoma 
House Passes Solar Surcharge Bill, OKLAHOMAN (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://newsok.com/article/3955378 [https://perma.cc/QS6P-FNTJ]; Distributed 
Energy Resource Program Act, No. 236 of 2014, Docket No. 2014-246-E, (S.C. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n Dec. 11, 2014) (order approving settlement agreement); Garrett 
Hering, West Virginia Governor Approves Previously Vetoed Net Metering Bill, 
P.V. MAG. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/ 
details/beitrag/west-virginia-governor-approves-previously-vetoed-net-metering-
bill-_100018604/#axzz4PAH3KpWY [https://perma.cc/937T-62EK]; Roy L. Hales, 
Utilities Try to Harness Net Metering in Washington State, CLEAN TECHNICA 
(Mar. 17, 2014), https://cleantechnica.com/2014/03/17/utilities-try-harness-net-
metering-washington-state/ [https://perma.cc/F4R8-M3HD]; Kari Lydersen, In 
Wisconsin, Solar ‘New Math’ Could Equal Big Impacts, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS 
(Jan. 16, 2015), http://midwestenergynews.com/2015/01/16/in-wisconsin-solar-new-
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states such as Arizona where solar panels are most popular.89 
Opponents assert that consumers with solar panels are “free 
riding” off the grid: by running the meter backwards, 
sometimes all the way to zero, net metering allows them to 
escape from paying their fair share of grid maintenance costs, 
even though they rely on the grid’s services whenever they are 
under- or over-producing power.90  Some utilities have alleged 
that the cost-shift from net-metered to non-net-metered 
customers may be as high as $1000 per residential net-metered 
system, and have argued that net-metered customers should 
pay special charges to compensate for their added costs.91 This 
“free riding”—or, more accurately, cross-subsidization—
appears particularly egregious when coupled with statistics 
showing that predominantly wealthier consumers put solar 
panels on their roofs.92  As these consumers enjoy the benefits 
 
math-could-equal-big-impacts/ [https://perma.cc/XTH5-S7SH].  
 89. See TOM STANTON, NAT’L REG. RES. INST., REPORT NO. 13–07 STATE AND 
UTILITY SOLAR ENERGY PROGRAMS: RECOMMENDED APPROACHES FOR GROWING 
MARKETS iv (July 2013) (suggesting that net metering reform will become 
increasingly pressing as solar’s growth continues); see also NAÏM R DARGHOUTH, 
GALEN BARBOSE, & RYAN WISER, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., LNVL-6017E, 
ELECTRICITY BILL SAVINGS FROM RESIDENTIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS: 
SENSITIVITIES TO CHANGES IN FUTURE ELECTRICITY MARKET CONDITIONS viii 
(Jan. 2013). 
 90. See, e.g., AZ Net Metering Decision, supra note 9, at 6 (describing Arizona 
utility’s concern that non-participants in net metering schemes shouldered a 
disproportionate share of grid maintenance costs). Utilities recover some grid 
maintenance costs through “fixed” portions of utility bills that all consumers 
(including net-metered customers) pay, but most utilities recover more than half 
of fixed costs through volumetric electricity rates. See Griselda Blackburn, Clare 
Magee & Varun Rai, Solar Valuation and the Modern Utility’s Expansion into 
Distributed Generation, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 18, 26 (2014); see also Frank A. Felder 
& Rasika Athawale, The Life and Death of the Utility Death Spiral, 27 
ELECTRICITY J. 9 (2014); Ryan Hledik, Rediscovering Residential Demand 
Charges, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 82, 84 (2014).  
 91. See AZ Net Metering Decision, supra note 9, at 6.  
 92. One 2013 California study found that whereas the median California 
household income is $54,283, the average median household income of customers 
installing net-metered systems since 1999 was $91,210. See ENERGY AND ENVTL. 
ECON., INC., INTRODUCTION TO THE CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING 
RATEPAYER IMPACTS EVALUATION 11 (Oct. 28, 2013). A smaller 2011 study of San 
Diego and Sacramento revealed that the median income for neighborhoods with at 
least one solar panel system was 84 percent higher than for neighborhoods with 
no solar. Samuel Dastrup et al., Understanding the Solar Home Price Premium: 
Electricity Generation and “Green” Social Status 20 tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Res., Working Paper No. 17200, July 2011). The growth of third-party leasing, 
where a homeowner contracts with a company that agrees to install and maintain 
solar panels on their home, is likely to lessen the regressive nature of net 
metering by eliminating up-front infrastructure costs for homeowners. See Jason 
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of self-generation, lower-income consumers who cannot afford 
solar panels are left shouldering a rising proportion of grid 
maintenance costs. 
In contrast, net metering proponents insist that 
distributed solar generation provides substantial benefits to 
the grid, thereby lowering overall grid costs for all consumers, 
such that solar customers aren’t cross-subsidized. In fact, they 
might even be getting underpaid by net metering for the energy 
that they supply to the grid.93 Frustratingly for regulators, 
empirical evidence does not provide conclusive answers to this 
debate. Most studies show that average retail rates—at which 
net-metered customers are credited—approximate the value of 
solar to the grid, with about half of the studies finding that 
solar is underpaid, and the other half finding that solar is 
overpaid.94 These divergent results point to a deeper challenge 
in framing this equity debate as an empirical question. The 
results depend heavily on the values measured: when solar 
energy’s environmental and social benefits are included within 
a study, its overall value predictably rises considerably.95 But 
whether to include these external benefits within solar’s grid 
 
R. Wiener & Christian Alexander, On-site Renewable Energy and Public Finance: 
How and Why Municipal Bond Financing is the Key to Propagating Access to On-
Site Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 559, 566 (2010). But third-party leasing cannot change the fact that 
over two-thirds of American residences aren’t solar-appropriate. See Samantha 
Booth, Here Comes the Sun: How Securities Regulations Cast a Shadow on the 
Growth of Community Solar in the United States, 61 UCLA L. REV. 760, 767 
(2014). 
 93. Solar energy can lower energy and capacity costs that utilities would 
otherwise incur; reduce the need for investments in transmission and distribution 
infrastructure; act as a fuel price hedge to natural gas or coal; provide resilience 
to the grid by decentralizing generation; reduce conventional air pollutants, 
carbon emissions, and water and land use; and improve economic development by 
providing more local jobs and tax revenue. But precisely valuing these benefits 
remains controversial. See Travis Bradford & Anne Hoskins, Valuing Distributed 
Energy: Economic and Regulatory Challenges 13–14 (Princeton Roundtable, 
Working Paper, 2013). 
 94. Laura Hansen et al., A Review of Solar PV Benefit & Cost Studies 22 
(Rocky Mountain Institute, 2d ed. Sept. 2013) (meta-study reviewing seventeen 
recent studies of solar’s value to the grid) [hereinafter RMI DG Study]. See also 
STANTON, supra note 89, at 22 (reviewing existing studies of solar’s costs and 
benefits and reaching similar conclusions about the trends in these studies). 
However, as the RMI DG Study cautions, average retail rates cannot perfectly 
measure whether solar is appropriately compensated by net metering, because 
this determination depends on the particular tariff utilized by the net-metered 
customer. See id. at 22. 
 95. See STANTON, supra note 89, at 22.  
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valuation turns on the question of what values regulators want 
ratepayers to fund. This question is fraught: While the societal 
benefits of solar may be considerable, it is not clear whether 
remaining grid customers, as opposed to society as a whole, 
should shoulder the costs of attaining solar’s non-monetized 
environmental benefits. 
State regulators have adopted divergent responses to these 
complex equity considerations. In 2014, Arizona imposed 
special charges on solar customers96 and Wisconsin increased 
the fixed portion of all utility bills.97 In late 2015, Nevada chose 
to suspend its net metering program, prompting a crash of its 
solar industry.98 Most states have taken a more cautious 
approach, demanding closer empirical scrutiny before 
reforming net metering.99 An increasingly popular policy option 
is the “value of solar tariff,” which attempts to more precisely 
compensate solar owners for the value of the energy they 
produce to the grid, while charging them separately for the 
power they draw from the grid.100 Technical solutions like this 
 
 96. See, e.g., AZ Net Metering Decision, supra note 9 (Commissioner Burns, 
dissenting) (imposing a per-kilowatt of solar capacity charge that will amount to 
$4.90 on average per solar customer per month). 
 97. Application of Wisc. Pub. Serv. Corp. for Authority to Adjust Electric and 
Natural Gas Rates, No. 6690-UR-123, 2014 WL 7398755, 39–54 (Wisc. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n Dec. 18, 2014) (final decision) (raising fixed charges on all customers); see 
also Thomas Content, Regulators Agree to Increase Fixed Charge on WE Energies 
Electric Bills, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://archive.jsonline.com/business/psc-begins-consideration-of-we-energies-rate-
hike-plan-b99390765z1-282726581.html [https://perma.cc/M6Z7-PF5Q] (reporting 
that the decision will raise the fixed portion of bills from around $9 to $16 per 
month).  
 98. See Ivan Penn, SolarCity to Leave Nevada After PUC Cuts Rooftop Solar 
Benefits, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
solarcity-nevada-rooftop-20151223-story.html [https://perma.cc/YA6D-9QSA]; 
Chris Nelder & Mark Dyson, Rocky Mountain Inst., Nevada, Previously a Solar 
Leader, Shutters its Residential Rooftop Market, RMI BLOG (Jan. 15, 2016),  
http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2016_01_15_nevada_shutters_its_residential_rooftop_ 
market  [https://perma.cc/54WE-F7F8]. 
 99. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 2514m, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (ordering 
commission to evaluate “who benefits from, and who bears the economic burden, if 
any, of the net energy metering program”); Assemb. B. 8557, 237th Leg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2013) (similar).  
 100. See CLEAN POWER RESEARCH, MINN. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MINNESOTA 
VALUE OF SOLAR: METHODOLOGY (Apr. 1, 2014), http://mn.gov/commerce/energy/ 
images/MN-VOS-Methodology-FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/VEA4-VHE5] (adopting a 
“Value of Solar Methodology” that utilities can use in place of net metering). 
Minnesota’s program is modeled off of a similar effort by the municipal utility in 
Austin, Texas. See CLEAN POWER RESEARCH, AUSTIN ENERGY, 2014 VALUE OF 
SOLAR AT AUSTIN ENERGY 2 (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/ 
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will be important for appropriately compensating solar 
customers without escalating costs for remaining ratepayers, 
but they do not go the full distance in remedying equity 
concerns. Even if solar owners are accurately compensated, 
there remains the question of whether we are comfortable with 
the marketplace determining which consumers become a part 
of the distributed generation movement, and which do not. 
C. Smart Meters, the Smart Grid, and Dynamic Pricing 
The smart grid and smart meters hold considerable 
promise for helping to make the grid more efficient, as these 
technologies will allow much more accurate and time-sensitive 
tracking and management of electricity supply and demand.101  
However, they also raise significant equity concerns, largely 
due to the potential pricing changes they enable.102 The 
installation of around fifty million smart meters in 
approximately 43 percent of U.S. households103 has caused 
many scholars and regulators to push for changes in electricity 
pricing.104 Right now, the vast majority of consumers pay a flat 
rate per kilowatt-hour for their electricity even though the 
costs of generating power fluctuate considerably over the 
course of a day and a year.105 “Dynamic pricing” refers to a 
 
document.cfm?id=199131 [perma.cc/3ZJR-EBJD]. See also NAT’L ASSN. OF 
REGULATORY UTILITY COMM’RS., DRAFT MANUAL ON DISTRIBUTED ENERGY 
RESOURCES COMPENSATION (2016), http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/88954963-0F01-
F4D9-FBA3-AC9346B18FB2 [perma.cc/4B8H-B9LY] (setting forth various options 
for reforming rate design to account for the costs and benefits of integrating 
distributed energy resources into the grid). 
 101. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.   
 102. BARBARA ALEXANDER, SMART METERS, REAL TIME PRICING, AND DEMAND 
RESPONSE PROGRAMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR LOW INCOME ELECTRIC CUSTOMERS 4 
(2007). Opponents have also raised privacy and health concerns against smart 
meters. See generally Katrina Fischer Kuh, Personal Environmental Information: 
The Promise and Perils of the Emerging Capacity to Identify Individual 
Environmental Harms, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1566 (2012); Smart Meter Health 
Complaints, EMF Safety Network, http://emfsafetynetwork.org/smart-
meters/smart-meter-health-complaints/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/QR3Z-YQZZ]; Sonia McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 199 (2011); Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of 
Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (2011). 
 103. EDISON ELEC. INST., UTILITY-SCALE SMART METER DEPLOYMENT: 
BUILDING BLOCK OF THE ELECTRIC POWER GRID 1 (2014).  
 104. See Severin Borenstein, Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-In 
Residential Dynamic Electricity Pricing, 42 REV. IND. ORGAN. 127, 127 (2013); 
Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 60, at 381–83.  
 105. See Borenstein, Jaske & Rosenfeld, supra note 82, at 5.  
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range of rate design reforms that would better align retail 
electricity pricing with the price fluctuations that occur in 
wholesale electricity markets.106 These reforms would make 
retail rates more expensive during peak demand periods, such 
as early evenings on hot summer days, while dramatically 
lowering them during periods when supply is high but demand 
is low, such as late-night wind surges. Reforms might take the 
form of real-time pricing, where customers pay a retail rate 
directly linked to the wholesale price of electricity; time-of-use 
rates, which employ several different pricing levels for different 
times of day; or critical peak pricing, which prices certain 
particularly expensive hours much higher (generally 100-200 
hours per year).107 These pricing reforms help consumers 
understand, through market signals, how to participate 
effectively in energy markets.108 
Spurred by federal funding,109 many states and localities 
have run pilot programs to experiment with dynamic pricing 
options.110 These experiments—and the possibility they augur 
that dynamic pricing could become a commonplace mandatory 
or default pricing option111—have prompted a staunch equity 
backlash.112 Opponents worry that such schemes will 
disproportionately harm low-income consumers because the 
 
 106. See id. at 5–7. 
 107. See AHMAD FARUQUI ET AL., INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY WHITE PAPER, 
THE IMPACT OF DYNAMIC PRICING ON LOW INCOME CONSUMERS 4–5 (Sept. 2010). 
 108. Ahmad Faruqui, The Ethics of Dynamic Pricing, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 13, 13 
(2010) (reviewing several studies finding that dynamic pricing might reduce peak 
consumption from ten to fourteen percent).  
 109. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115; Eisen, supra note 57, at 18 (explaining that “[f]ederal funds 
defraying half the cost” made smart grid projects more appealing to state 
commissions). 
 110. See Theresa Flaim et al., Pilot Paralysis: Why Dynamic Pricing Remains 
Over-Hyped and Underachieved, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 8, 10 (2013). 
 111. Few states seem willing to mandate dynamic pricing for all customers 
without an opt-out. However, default dynamic pricing is likely to capture a 
majority of customers: “the limited literature on the topic suggests that about 80 
percent would stay on dynamic pricing if it is offered as the default rate . . . .” 
AHMAD FARUQUI ET AL., THE BRATTLE GROUP, THE POWER OF FIVE PERCENT: 
HOW DYNAMIC PRICING CAN SAVE $35 BILLION IN ELECTRICITY COSTS 4 (May 
2007). In contrast, voluntary dynamic pricing schemes requiring opt-in have seen 
very low uptake. See Stefanie A. Brand, Dynamic Pricing for Residential Electric 
Customers: A Ratepayer Advocate’s Perspective, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 50, 52 (2010).   
 112. See, e.g., AARP, National Consumer Law Center, and Public Citizen, 
Comment on Smart Grid RFI: Addressing Policy and Logistical Options (2010),  
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/AARPNCLCPublic_
CitizenCommentsDOE1101.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9PU-6AYQ]. 
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class of low-income consumers disproportionately includes the 
elderly, those out of work, and those at home caring for 
children.113 These consumers may not be able to cut demand 
during peak periods as easily as those fully employed outside of 
the home.114 Furthermore, low-income consumers may have 
the least ability to make investments in thermostats and 
automated appliances that help control the timing of energy 
use.115 
As in the net metering debate, regulators take these equity 
concerns seriously. Even though experts view dynamic pricing 
as one of the most effective reforms for promoting more 
rational energy use, regulators hesitate to employ it: a 2010 
survey found that only one percent of residential customers are 
on time-of-use rates, while very few utilities even offer real-
time pricing.116 Regulators remain resistant to these reforms 
predominantly because of worries about how dynamic pricing 
might redistribute costs among consumers.117 
Like net metering, dynamic pricing’s equity impacts are 
less certain than its opponents fear. Current electricity rates 
contain a hidden (although long-accepted) cross-subsidy: those 
who use less energy at peak times are subsidizing those who 
use more.118 Because the poor do not typically consume a larger 
share of their power during peak hours,119 and may actually 
consume less during peak periods, dynamic pricing might 
produce a progressive shift in rate design, immediately 
lowering most low-income consumers’ bills.120 
 
 113. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 17; Brand, supra note 111, at 52.  
 114. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 17; Brand, supra note 111, at 52.  
 115. See Barbara R. Alexander, Dynamic Pricing? Not So Fast! A Residential 
Consumer Perspective, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 39, 43 (2010). 
 116. Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 60, at 382.  
 117. Id. at 384; see also, e.g., In the Matter of the Application of Baltimore Gas 
and Elec. Co. for Authorization to Deploy a Smart Grid Initiative and to Establish 
a Surcharge for the Recovery of Cost, No. 9208, Order No. 83410, at 6 (Md. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n June 21, 2010) (rejecting utility’s application for a smart grid 
program in part because the Commission was “persuaded that some of the 
Company’s most vulnerable residential customers . . . are less likely to realize the 
potential benefits of [time-of-use] pricing than would the ‘average’ residential 
customer”). 
 118. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 19–20.  
 119. Borenstein, supra note 104, at 139.  
 120. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 17 fig.9 (meta-review of seventy dynamic 
pricing studies from around the country). Faruqui found that dynamic pricing is 
likely to immediately lower bills for two-thirds to three-quarters of all customers. 
Id. at 16; see also FARUQUI ET AL., supra note 107 (examining five dynamic pricing 
schemes from around the U.S. and reaching similar conclusions). 
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However, there is a rival consideration when it comes to 
the equity of dynamic pricing: the long term impacts of a 
pricing change may be even more significant than its 
immediate impacts, especially in a world where electricity 
prices are likely to rise over time. To understand the impacts of 
dynamic pricing policies that are expected to endure and 
perhaps become more stringent over time, it matters 
considerably whether consumers will be able to make changes 
in the time of their electricity consumption in order to manage 
their bills. The evidence of low-income consumers’ ability to 
adapt to dynamic pricing signals is mixed: while there is some 
evidence that low-income consumers respond well,121 other 
studies have shown that higher-income households are more 
responsive.122 And irrespective of immediate responsiveness, 
there is a longer-term risk associated with the increasingly 
important role that costly new technologies are likely to play in 
load management over time. If these technologies remain out of 
reach for low-income consumers, then they will be less able to 
manage spikes in their loads that occur during periods of high 
demand, causing increased bill volatility and higher prices.123 
Thus again, empirical studies may prove useful but not 
determinative in debates over dynamic pricing schemes, given 
the inability of such studies to make the value judgments 
necessary to balance short-term benefits and long-term 
concerns. To date, the empirical evidence has not persuaded 
regulators: although pilots abound, no state has moved to 
mandatory dynamic pricing, and very few utilities even offer 
opt-out programs that make dynamic pricing the default.124 
 
 121. Faruqui, supra note 108, at 22–23 (reviewing a D.C. study of a critical 
peak pricing rebate program that found that low-income consumers were two 
times more likely to respond than other consumers); see also FARUQUI ET AL., 
supra note 107, at 21 (finding no measurable difference in response based on 
income). 
 122. Ahmad Faruqui & Stephen George, Quantifying Customer Response to 
Dynamic Pricing, 18 ELECTRICITY J. 53, 56 (2005) (finding that college-educated 
households and households with higher incomes are twice as responsive to 
dynamic pricing as low-income households). 
 123. See, e.g., Lisa Wood & Ahmad Faruqui, Better Data, New Conclusions, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2011, at 47, 47 (2011) (“[L]ow-income consumers did 
respond to dynamic pricing, but in most cases their rate of price responsiveness 
was lower than that for non-low-income consumers.”); Flaim et al., supra note 
110, at 18 (finding that the response was 3.5 times larger when control 
technologies accompanied dynamic pricing). 
 124. A May 2015 Washington Post article reported that out of 50 million 
smart-metered customers, only eight million have access to any kind of “smart 
9. 88.3 WELTON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2017  7:27 PM 
2017] CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION 601 
D. Energy Storage and Electric Vehicles 
Energy storage and electric vehicles present largely 
untapped but significant possibilities for grid participation. 
Energy storage125 is emerging triumphant from years of slow 
technological progress as it gains in affordability.126 Buoyed by 
these advancements, California recently became the first state 
to impose an energy storage mandate on its utilities, requiring 
them to procure 1,325 megawatts of energy storage by 2020 in 
an effort to create a market for storage and further drive down 
its costs.127 Ratepayers will bear the costs of procuring this 
storage.128 
Ratepayer funding of this program has proven 
controversial, in part because storage remains a relatively 
experimental technology with unproven benefits, but in part 
due to more explicit equity concerns.129 Energy storage has two 
 
pricing” program, and considerably fewer actually use one. Chris Mooney, You 
Should Be Saving Energy and Money on Hot Days This Summer. Here’s Why 
You’re (Probably) Not, WASH. POST (May 21, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/05/21/hot-
summer-days-could-be-helping-you-save-energy-and-money-heres-why-theyre-
probably-not/?utm_term=.da9fd6835a30 [https://perma.cc/ZZ9J-HP75]. California 
is poised to become the first state to require its utilities to utilize default time-
variant pricing. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Proposed Decision, supra note 54.  
 125. Energy storage can take many forms, including batteries, flywheels, 
compressed air, and “pumped hydro,” where water is pumped up a hill during 
periods of low demand and then used to generate power during periods of higher 
demand. See Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case 
for Energy Storage, 41 FL. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 697, 705–07 (2014). 
 126. See, e.g., John Vidal, Big Power Out, Solar In: Ubs Urges Investors to Join 
Renewables Revolution, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2014/aug/27/ubs-investors-renewables-revolution [https://perma.cc/ 
98TD-ZR3X]  (describing a recent UBS memo to investors predicting that by 2025, 
everyone will be able to produce and store power cost-competitively due to 
declining battery costs); Richard Fioravanti, Energy Storage: Out of the Lab and 
Onto the Grid, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 2015, at 30, 33 (“In 2013 and 2014, utilities 
issued more . . . announcements for megawatts of storage than in the past 30 
years combined.”). 
 127. Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to Assembly Bill 2514 to 
Consider the Adoption of Procurement Targets for Viable and Cost-Effective 
Energy Storage Sys., D. 14-01-029, 2014 WL 252061, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Cal. Energy Storage Order].  
 128. Approving San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Pacific Gas & Electric 
Company, and Southern California Edison Company’s Storage Procurement 
Framework and Program, D. 14-10-045, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Oct. 16, 
2014). 
 129. See Cal. Energy Storage Order, supra note 127, at 16 (discussing utilities’ 
filed comments that “the targets are very aggressive and will come at a high cost 
to California ratepayers”). 
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promising applications. First, storage might form a critical part 
of a renewable energy-powered grid, as it could store energy 
produced during periods of abundant sun and wind for release 
during other times, thereby solving renewable energy’s 
worrisome “intermittency” problem.130 Second, storage might 
act not as a grid stabilizer but as a grid replacement: if 
distributed generation—that is, small-scale, locally-sited 
generation—can be cost-effectively combined with storage, self-
generating consumers will no longer have any need for the 
grid.131 This latter possibility presents similar but more severe 
equity concerns than net metering. With affordable storage, 
rich consumers might exit the grid altogether.132 On a large 
scale, such exit would radically change electricity’s social 
infrastructure, decoupling wealthy consumers and large 
businesses from the remainder of the population’s need for grid 
stability and maintenance.133  Whether or not mass grid exit is 
likely depends on many unknown factors, including future 
storage costs and regulatory strategies.134 But its mere 
possibility haunts discussions of policies promoting energy 
storage. 
A similar set of concerns animates the controversy over 
 
 130. Intermittency refers to the fact that renewable resources are 
intermittently available based on weather conditions, rather than on stand-by to 
respond to levels of customer demand. See JIM EYER & GARTH COREY, SANDIA 
NAT’L LABS., ENERGY STORAGE FOR THE ELECTRICITY GRID: BENEFITS AND 
MARKET POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT GUIDE at xvi (2010). 
 131. See BRONSKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 6 (predicting that grid parity for 
solar-plus-battery systems is “well within the 30-year planned economic life of 
central power plants and transmission infrastructure”); see also Diane Cardwell, 
Solar Power Battle Puts Hawaii at Forefront of Worldwide Changes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/business/energy-environment/ 
solar-power-battle-puts-hawaii-at-forefront-of-worldwide-changes.html 
[https://perma.cc/7E8L-ZBH4] (describing growing trend in Hawaii of installing 
solar plus batteries). 
 132. See, e.g., NY REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 2 (“[T]he trend toward 
affordability of self-generation threatens to create an unacceptable gap between 
those who can choose to leave the grid and those who cannot, with implications for 
the obligation to ensure reasonably priced and reliable service.”). 
 133. There is not yet empirical evidence on who precisely will exit the grid as 
the combination of storage and on-site generation becomes a more viable economic 
proposition, but one can surmise that, similar to solar panels, it is likely to be 
those consumers able to afford the intensive up-front capital costs. On solar, see 
supra note 92; on grid exit more generally, see BRONSKI ET AL., supra note 63. 
 134. RMI estimates the year in which distributed generation combined with 
storage will reach “grid parity” (i.e., will cost the same as remaining connected to 
the grid) in five states: pre-2014 (Hawaii); 2025 (New York); 2031 (California); 
and 2047 (Kentucky and Texas). BRONSKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 7 fig.1.  
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how to fund the construction of a robust electric vehicle (EV) 
infrastructure, capable of coaxing car owners out of their oil-
fired cars and into grid-powered ones. After years of slow 
progress by private companies, some states are considering 
whether to permit their regulated utilities to take over the task 
of building a public network of charging stations, with the costs 
borne by utility ratepayers.135 The move would serve the dual 
purposes of “making the electric car a viable alternative for 
millions of consumers” and “helping shore up [utilities’] 
flattening business of supplying electricity.”136 Again, however, 
equity concerns loom large. In particular, ratepayer advocates 
question whether it is “fair to burden the majority of . . . 
ratepayers with building the network. . . .”137 These fairness 
concerns stem from two distinct sources: ratepayer advocates 
question the certainty of the benefits that the public will derive 
from investing in a charging station network, and also worry 
that the benefits of this network are likely to accrue 
predominantly to more affluent ratepayers, who will be more 
likely to adopt EV technology.138 Alongside determinations over 
the extent to which ratepayers should fund charging networks, 
public utility commissions will play an important role in 
determining the rates customers pay for charging their EVs, 
and the rates customers receive if their EVs function as grid 
storage.139 The compensation levels set for EVs acting as 
batteries are likely to spur a debate similar to net metering, 
regarding whether EVs should be rewarded above the level of 
wholesale electricity prices for the benefits they provide to the 
grid and beyond. 
E. Whose Equity Concerns? 
It would be naïve to think that deep and abiding concerns 
over the fate of low-income consumers drive all of the equity 
 
 135. See Diane Cardwell, Utilities Push Into Fuel Stations for Electric Cars, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/business/utilities-
push-into-fuel-stations-for-electric-cars.html [https://perma.cc/M5ZZ-XADL]; see 
also Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility 
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 371, 399–400 (2014) (describing the Oregon PUC’s hesitation to approve 
ratepayer funding of EV infrastructure).  
 136. Cardwell, supra note 135.  
 137. See id.; see also Truong, supra note 41, at 495.  
 138. Truong, supra note 41, at 495. 
 139. Scott, supra note 135, at 399.  
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arguments against clean energy policies. As mentioned in the 
introduction, utilities frequently mount the strongest equity 
arguments against these policies,140 although consumer 
advocates and other interest groups often join them.141 And 
utilities sometimes seem to be using equity arguments 
opportunistically, given the fact that in opposing these clean 
energy policies, they are centrally concerned with the impacts 
the policies are likely to have on the utility business model.142 
For example, in the case of net metering, if the policy does in 
fact shunt more grid costs onto a smaller, poorer group of 
consumers, then these price increases create incentives for 
more customers to install distributed generation, which in turn 
causes prices to rise even further. Some fear that this will 
ultimately create a “utility death spiral,” with the remaining 
customer base unable to support the costs of maintaining the 
grid and the regulated business model failing.143 Similar 
concerns over revenue impacts animate utility opposition to 
smart grid, dynamic pricing schemes, and energy storage—
 
 140. EV infrastructure policies are an exception—utilities frequently support 
these because such projects expand the demand for electricity. See Cardwell, 
supra note 135. 
 141. See, e.g., STANTON, supra note 89, at 1 (noting that “[m]any interested 
parties are sounding alarms,” although singling out utilities as taking a lead). For 
its part, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) has included energy as a core civil rights issue in its agenda, and 
supports net metering as “an opportunity to break fossil fuel company monopolies 
that are actively resistant to transition, by offering options for consumers to 
generate clean energy and drive this necessary transition.” Jacqueline Patterson, 
Environmental and Climate Justice Director, Energy Democracy, 
#BlackLivesMatter, and the NAACP Advocacy Agenda, Webinar on Net Metering 
for Solar Advocates Hosted by the Energy Foundation (May 29, 2015), 
http://www.naacp.org/latest/energy-democracy-blacklivesmatter-and-the-naacp-
advocacy-agenda/ [https://perma.cc/G3ZW-JHY8]. Individual state chapters of the 
NAACP have diverged, however, on their opinions with respect to net metering. 
Compare, e.g., R. L. Nave, NAACP Calls for ‘Energy Justice’, JACKSON FREE 
PRESS (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2013/dec/26/naacp-
calls-energy-justice/ [https://perma.cc/8KPR-4QRY] (expressing Mississippi 
NAACP Chapter’s support for net metering), with Evan Halper, Mintority Groups 
Back Energy Companies in Fight Against Solar Power, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-solar-race-20150209-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/2CS5-QR6Y] (describing Florida NAACP Chapter’s opposition to 
net metering).  
 142. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 1675–82 (describing in more detail the 
concerns over the sustainability of rate-of-return regulation); Graffy & Kihm, 
supra note 14.  
 143. See PETER KIND, EDISON ELECTRIC INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: 
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL 
ELECTRIC BUSINESS 6–9 (Jan. 2013); Graffy & Kihm, supra note 14.  
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each of which has the possibility of harming utilities’ 
profitability under current regulatory regimes.144 
The fact that utilities so frequently filter their protectionist 
concerns through discussions of equity, however, serves to 
underscore its importance in electricity law: utilities make 
these arguments because they are aware that regulators care 
about the equities of clean energy policies.145 Even so, the 
messenger shapes the arguments made. In each of the cases 
examined above, the right asserted on behalf of low-income 
consumers is in opposition to progress on clean energy: a right 
not to subsidize richer customers’ solar energy preferences; not 
to face pricing schemes that increase bill volatility but reduce 
carbon emissions; and not to pay extra to support experimental 
technologies that the rich are likely to adopt first. To frame 
these concerns in this way is not to suggest that they are 
necessarily unreasonable demands. But it makes the equity 
concerns with clean energy appear to be limited to ensuring 
that no policies are adopted or persist that unfairly distribute 
grid maintenance costs among consumers. In the following 
parts, I suggest that this is a profoundly shortsighted way to 
approach the question of how climate change, clean energy, and 
equity interact. 
It is not only utilities, however, that are guilty of 
shortsighted approaches to clean energy and equity. Clean 
energy advocates, skeptical of utilities’ motives in asserting 
equity concerns, often respond by initiating an empirical battle, 
seeking to debunk the validity of such concerns through better 
studies and more precise valuation of clean energy policies’ 
benefits.146 The empirical disagreements described above in the 
cases of net metering and dynamic pricing are examples of this 
phenomenon. This response is understandable, and this 
evidence can be useful to commissions evaluating the merits of 
equity claims. Identifying and addressing real cross-
 
 144. Quinn and Reed adeptly explain why utilities may aggressively promote 
only that part of the smart grid vision that poses no threat to their bottom line. 
See Quinn & Reed, supra note 14, at 840–47. For reasons they observe, many 
utilities will be natural opponents of smart grid policies aimed at inducing 
strategic conservation of energy, such as smart meters and dynamic pricing. See 
also Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 14, at 1531. 
 145. See KIND, supra note 143, at 1 (explaining how regulators’ concerns about 
not overburdening low-income consumers who remain tied to the grid as prices 
rise might ultimately lead to stranded costs that utilities will have to absorb).  
 146. See, e.g., supra notes 93–94.  
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subsidization claims—and parsing these from other, self-
interested utility complaints—will certainly be one important 
component of achieving clean energy justice. 
However, responding piecemeal to narrow concerns about 
the equity implications of particular policies misses the validity 
of longer-term concerns about clean energy equity. These 
concerns cannot be captured empirically or in the context of 
any particular clean energy policy debate, but are nevertheless 
vital questions about the future of energy in American society. 
F.  A More Holistic Conception of Clean Energy’s Equity 
Problem 
The debates highlighted above do not lend themselves to 
easy conclusions regarding the equitability of particular clean 
energy policies at particular points in time. But moving past 
empiricism to long-term thinking, I believe clean energy’s 
opponents have highlighted a potentially significant problem. 
The suite of policies that makes up the participatory grid 
portends a troubling future for electricity law’s commitment to 
widespread affordability. Standing alone, participatory grid 
policies may not pose an unequivocal threat to low-income 
consumers, as there might not be that much to lose from non-
participation. However, the likely interaction between 
participatory grid policies and additional state and federal 
policies presents particular cause for concern. Participatory 
grid policies are just one component of the significant 
transitional policies that climate experts agree will be 
necessary to keep climate change to manageable levels. These 
transitional policies are likely to require substantial 
infrastructure investment, accompanied by a hefty price tag 
that will be borne by those ratepayers still connected to the 
grid and still drawing power during periods of high demand. 
Meeting the world’s agreed-upon but non-binding goal of 
keeping planetary warming below two degrees Celsuis147—a 
politically ambitious yet already ecologically questionable 
 
 147. See Framework Convention on Climate Change Draft Dec. -/CP.15, 
Coppenhagen Accord, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, at 1 (Dec. 18, 2009). At the 
2015 Paris climate change negotiations, delegates further agreed to attempt to 
keep warming “well below” two degrees. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Draft Dec. -/CP.21, Paris Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, art. 2 
(Dec. 12, 2015).  
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aim148—would require near total elimination of developed 
country greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.149 The implications 
for U.S. clean energy policy are twofold: First, we would have to 
almost completely decarbonize our electricity sector, switching 
to some mixture of renewable energy, fossil energy combined 
with carbon capture and storage, and nuclear energy.150 
Second, the country would have to electrify several additional 
sectors, most notably transportation and heating.151 All told, if 
the U.S. were to make good on its portion of the two-degree 
commitment (an unlikely scenario, but a useful one for 
understanding the scale of changes necessary), electricity 
generation would need to approximately double by 2050, while 
carbon emissions from electricity were reduced to three to ten 
percent of current levels.152 Even if pursued only half-heartedly 
and as economically as possible, the necessary changes would 
increase electricity bills for those customers who continue to 
rely on the grid for their power.153 
In the face of these changes, state policies that focus on a 
participatory grid as a decarbonization strategy present a 
particular challenge. To become a part of this new grid requires 
significant technological investment. A platform of solar 
panels, smart grids, new appliances, electric vehicles, and self-
storage does not ring of egalitarianism, given the costs 
 
 148. See James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: 
Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations, and 
Nature, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at 2 (finding that “there are already clear 
indications of undesirable impacts at the current level of warming and that 2°C 
warming would have major deleterious consequences”). 
 149. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 24, at 1. 
 150. Id. at xi (finding four plausible scenarios for decarbonization, which rely 
either on high deployment of renewables, nuclear, carbon capture and storage, or 
a “mixed case”). 
 151. Id. at xiii, 25 (finding in all decarbonization scenarios that the “use of 
electricity and fuels produced from electricity increases from around 20% at 
present to more than 50% by 2050”). 
 152. Id. at xii; see also STERN, supra note 23, at 238 (noting that stabilization 
at any level of ultimate CO2 concentration will require reducing global emissions 
by approximately 80 percent); WORKING GROUP III, supra note 23, at 20 (“In the 
majority of low-stabilization scenarios, the share of low-carbon electricity 
supply . . . increases from the current share of approximately 30% to more than 
80% by 2050, and fossil fuel power generation without CCS is phased out almost 
entirely by 2100.”).  
 153. Cf. STERN, supra note 23, at 212 (“Any costs to the economy of cutting 
GHG emissions, like other costs, will ultimately be borne by households. 
Emissions-intensive products will either become more expensive or impossible to 
buy.”). 
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involved, even if—and this is a critical, underappreciated 
point—customers who remain tied to the grid are not unjustly 
cross-subsidizing these technologies’ profusion. Even after all 
cross-subsidies are eliminated, a focus on empowering 
consumer action may leave low-income consumers, and even 
plenty of “middle class” consumers,154 isolated from these 
changes. 
Put differently, reforming participatory grid policies to 
more precisely align costs with rates only addresses the 
efficiency concerns raised by the participatory grid, by focusing 
on achieving perfect distribution of costs as a method of 
maximizing social welfare.155 Within electricity law, this 
principle is often called cost causation or the cost-price 
standard: a belief that every person should pay precisely for 
the costs she causes to the system.156 
But it is not clear that cost causation actually maximizes 
welfare in the electricity context. Cost causation is justified by 
the premise that keeping system costs as low as possible leaves 
society, as a whole, the most additional wealth to devote to 
other welfare enhancing endeavors.157 And this premise, in 
turn, depends upon the use of wealth as a proxy measure for 
welfare.158 
Wealth maximization may be a particularly poor proxy for 
welfare maximization in the context of electricity, where 
distribution matters considerably. Access to a certain basic 
quantity of electricity proves life-transformational and 
foundational to societal engagement, as the history in the next 
 
 154. Cf. Patricia Cohen, Middle Class But Feeling Economically Insecure, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/11/business/economy/ 
middle-class-but-feeling-economically-insecure.html [https://perma.cc/8LUY-
S8V3] (documenting the increasing economic vulnerability of Americans who 
identify as “middle class”). 
 155. See infra Part II for more on these two competing conceptions of equity. 
 156. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 21, at 23–25; K N Energy, Inc. v. Fed. Energy 
Reg. Comm’n, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[I]t has come to be well 
established that . . . rates should be based on the costs of providing service to the 
utility’s customers . . .”). 
 157. See David Spence, Naïve Energy Markets at 10–17 (Feb. 22, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (tracing conservative economic 
thought making this case). 
 158. See Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Kronman and 
Dworkin, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 248 (1980) (arguing for the “appeal of wealth 
maximization as an alternative to utilitarianism”), see also Spence, supra note 
157, at 20 (explaining economics’ break with utilitarian philosophy in the early-
twentieth century).  
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section illustrates. However, adding access to ever-increasing 
amounts of electricity has diminishing import in terms of life 
sustenance—for example, if an electricity user has access to ten 
times the basic amount necessary, adding that tenth unit 
might allow the user to upgrade from a 3,000-square-foot to a 
4,000-square-foot home.159 This fact means that a legal regime 
aiming not to maximize overall efficiency, but instead to 
provide certain basic minima to all citizens, may actually 
produce greater social welfare.160 If this is the case, then clean 
energy policy reforms that aim only to perfectly price costs and 
benefits may fail to deliver welfare gains. 
Moreover, even if cost causation is welfare maximizing as a 
theoretical matter, there is another hurdle to this approach: it 
does not reflect the balance struck, as a historical and political 
matter, within electricity law. As the next section will show, 
electricity law has never accepted perfect cost alignment as its 
sole aim. Instead, lawmakers and the voters who elected them 
have long been willing to sacrifice some efficiency for the sake 
of ensuring wider access.161 
II.  ENERGY LAW’S HISTORICAL EQUITY NORMS 
There is a reason that arguments implicating the 
inequities of clean energy policies resonate with energy 
regulators: electricity law has a longstanding commitment to 
incorporating and addressing equity concerns. I am not the 
first to observe the centrality of distributional issues in 
electricity law: scholars have long portrayed the field of public 
utility law as a protracted ideological battle between “equity,” 
 
 159. This argument reflects the well-accepted economics concept of diminishing 
marginal utility. See, e.g., Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A 
Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 867 (2002). 
 160. This critique is not novel: the argument that “wealth is too narrow a 
measure of human happiness” is “one of the most powerful critiques of the 
economic analysis of law.” Id. at 849. But it is a critique that often gets lost within 
the debates over energy market design. See Spence, supra note 157, at 20–22. I 
take up the argument that efficiency, or wealth maximization, remains a 
justifiable criterion for legal regime design, and that all redistribution should 
occur through the tax code. See infra Part III.D. 
 161. Cf. Spence, supra note 157, at 17 (“While economics seeks allocative 
efficiency, voters and their agents in Congress care not only about what is 
efficient, but also what is just, or fair; and they sometimes favor collective 
responses to risk.”). 
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on the one hand, and “efficiency,” on the other.162 In this view, 
regulators are caught in a compromise game between two 
camps of advocates. One side argues from the perspective of 
fairness or equity that electricity, as a fundamental service, 
should be priced based on need and ability to pay, such that 
lower-income consumers should receive discounted rates.163 
The other side defends the cost-causation principle introduced 
above as a means to maximize social welfare, arguing that 
perfectly apportioning costs to those who cause the system to 
incur the costs will maximize social welfare.164 These two 
contradictory approaches both manifest themselves in various 
facets of existing electricity law, causing scholars to long 
bemoan the field’s inability to muster a coherent approach to 
questions of equity.165 
In a time of rapidly shifting priorities within the field, it is 
worth a fresh look at electricity law’s equity norms. In this 
Part, I argue that framing electricity law as a protracted 
contest between equity and efficiency obscures what has long 
been electricity law’s underlying goal: a focus on access to 
affordable electricity as a means of enabling broad 
participation in markets and civil society. As this Part 
illustrates, electricity law since its inception has focused on 
widening the range of Americans able to take advantage of the 
opportunities electricity provides, and has therefore 
incorporated legal commitments to equity within a framework 
that frequently emphasizes efficiency in order to do so. 
Understanding energy’s equity commitment as rooted in this 
goal of widespread access is critically important in regulators’ 
effort to retain important historical norms and precedents in 
an era that requires radical shifts within the electricity sector. 
The regulatory mandate has always been—and remains—
enabling access to affordable power; it is only the means that 
must shift. 
 
 162. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 163. These arguments harken to John Rawls’s concept of “primary goods.” Cf. 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE xiii, 79 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing for a theory of 
equality that maximizes the least advantaged group’s index of “primary goods,” 
which are those things that “persons need . . . as normal and fully cooperating 
members of society over a complete life”). 
 164. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.  
 165. Trebing, supra note 21, at 31. 
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A. The Creation of Public Utility Law 
Before 1900, most Americans viewed electricity as a 
spectacle: It lit the homes of the wealthy and formed “Great 
White Ways” down the main streets of cities, but it was neither 
commonplace nor necessary.166 Fairly quickly, though, 
Americans came to understand electricity’s practical 
importance in easing the tasks of labor and daily home life.167 
At the same time, the technical elite saw its potential as a tool 
of social reform, capable of “dispers[ing] the ghettos of poverty, 
the slums of misery and the Alsatias of vice.”168 
For these reasons, although electricity began as a 
commodity produced and distributed by private companies,169 a 
public clamor began for government control over these 
businesses. The question of whether utilities should be 
privately owned or taken under municipal control became one 
of the most prominent political debates of the early 1900s.170 
Theodore Roosevelt advocated for increasing government 
supervision of the utility industry to ensure it was used “for 
and not against the interest of the people as a whole.”171 Many 
in the industry and the academy also propounded the view that 
these businesses were “natural monopolies” where competition 
did not make sense, because duplicative sets of transmission 
and distribution lines would be wasteful and inefficient.172 But 
 
 166. See NYE, supra note 27, at 2, 29, 242. 
 167. Id. at 186, 250. 
 168. John Burns, Municipal Ownership a Blessing, in INDEPENDENT, Vol. 60 at 
449 (1906) (advocating municipal ownership of electricity as a way to bring its 
virtues into more homes); NYE, supra note 27, at 157. 
 169. RICHARD HIRSH, POWER LOSS 12–14 (1999); NYE, supra note 27, at 139. 
 170. See, e.g., Edward F. Dunne, Our Fight for Municipal Ownership, 
INDEPENDENT Oct. 18, 1906, at 927 (“In recent years perhaps no subject has 
engrossed so much of the attention of the public in the great cities of this 
country . . . as the question of ownership and operation by the public of public 
utilities.”); DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A 
PROGRESSIVE AGE 135–36, 148–49 (1998) (noting that municipalization was a 
major issue in mayoral campaigns in New York City, Detroit, Chicago, San 
Francisco, and Cleveland, among others).  
 171. DAVID NYE, CONSUMING POWER 127 (1999) (quoting address by 
Roosevelt). 
 172. See PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 3–5; Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the 
Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8, 10 (1940). But see Robert 
L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regulation, 43, 54, 
in THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY 43, 43 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. 
Cole eds., 2003) (arguing that at its inception, “government intervention into 
electric markets was not the result of market failures but business and political 
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natural monopoly status also created the possibility of 
monopoly profits—an unacceptable proposition in the context of 
a good so fundamental to American notions of progress.173 
Lawmakers navigated this tension by declaring electric 
companies to be “public utilities,” which would be run by 
private entities but regulated by state commissions.174 
Wisconsin and New York formed the first state public utility 
commissions (PUCs) to oversee electric power in 1907,175 and 
by 1921 every state but Delaware had a commission.176 The 
framework established then persists largely intact today, at 
least for those elements of the electric utility industry that 
remain under commission control177: commissions govern 
utilities predominantly by “rate of return” regulation, 
rewarding utilities a monopoly service area and a “fair return” 
on their assets178 in exchange for delivering power under a set 
of conditions designed to protect the public. These conditions 
include (1) an obligation to serve all those within a utility’s 
service area who are willing and able to pay;179 (2) a 
requirement of safe and adequate service, (3) a prohibition on 
“undue or unjust price discrimination,” and (4) a requirement 
that rates be “just and reasonable.”180 
 
opportunism” and questioning whether the duplicative lines justification really 
held weight).  
 173. NYE, supra note 27, at 141.  
 174. See WILLIAM E. MOSHER ET AL., ELECTRICAL UTILITIES: THE CRISIS IN 
PUBLIC CONTROL 4 (1929). For more detailed accounts of the rise of public utility 
regulation, see Bradley, Jr., supra note 172; Boyd, supra note 14; William J. 
Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of State 
Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050 (2002); 
MOSHER, supra, ch. 1.  
 175. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 174, at 5.  
 176. NYE, supra note 27, at 181.  
 177. Since the 1990s, many states have required their electric utilities to sell 
most or all of their generation assets. See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, 
The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20 Years of Restructuring, 7 ANN. REV. ECON., 
437, 445 (2015). Some states have also introduced retail competition, such that 
only transmission and distribution utilities remain under commission oversight. 
See infra notes 237–240 and accompanying text.  
 178. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898) (allowing regulated 
companies to receive a “fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the 
public convenience.”). The Supreme Court has since repudiated the “fair value” 
standard, subsuming this question within the general inquiry of whether rates 
are “just and reasonable.” See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of 
Am., 315 U.S. 575, 602 (1942).  
 179. This obligation is frequently referred to as the “duty to serve.” See Rossi, 
supra note 21, at 1239.  
 180. See PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 118–19; Vol. 1, ALFRED E. KAHN, THE 
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Several of these conditions demonstrate an early 
commitment to access and affordability. The “just and 
reasonable” rates mandate aimed, at least in theory, to keep 
utility rates as low as possible for consumers.181 Similarly, the 
“obligation to serve” expanded access to all within a service 
area, including those most expensive to reach.182 And finally, 
the prohibition on “unjust discrimination” prohibited utilities 
from exploiting certain segments of the population by over-
charging them as compared to their peers.183 
B. Widening Access: Public Power 
Despite these protections, within a few decades the 
limitations of public utility law became apparent. Early critics 
railed against public utility law’s predominantly “negative” 
character, which “prohibited certain obvious forms of 
monopolistic behavior, but failed to impose definite 
responsibility for socially desirable actions” and lacked any 
“express mandate for the positive promotion of public 
welfare.”184 Such criticisms reflected the sense that lawmakers 
had an obligation to do more than merely prohibit price 
gouging for those already connected to the electric system. And 
this sentiment sprang from a stark reality facing the country 
by 1930 with respect to electricity: whereas urban dwellers 
 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS, at 3 (1988) 
(identifying the same four principal components of public utility regulation); Boyd, 
supra note 14, at 1641. 
 181. See, e.g., P.R. Tel. Co., Inc. v. Telecom. Reg. Bd. of P.R., 665 F.3d 309, 316 
(1st Cir. 2011) (“Regulation of retail prices focused on setting ‘just and reasonable 
rates,’ balancing the utility provider’s interest in a fair return on investment 
against the public’s interest in a fair price for services.”). 
 182. See N.Y. & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 351 (1917) (Public 
service corporations “may not pick and choose, serving only the portions of the 
territory covered by their franchises which it is presently profitable for them to 
serve . . . .”); PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 119.  
 183. See Robert Hale, Commissions, Rates, & Policies, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 
1105 (1940) (defining “unjust discrimination” as resulting “from unequal rates for 
services whose rates ought to be equal, or from equal rates for services whose 
rates ought to be different”). 
 184. Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & 
PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8, 16 (1940). See also KAHN, supra note 180, at 18 (“[T]he role of 
the government remains essentially negative—setting maximum prices . . . 
specifying minimum standards of service”); MOSHER ET AL., supra note 174, at xix 
(cataloguing “the extent to which the industry is still being administered as any 
other exploitative private industry”). 
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considered electricity a commonplace necessity,185 90 percent of 
farms still lacked access.186 
The notable gap in electricity service left by public utility 
regulation caused consternation among a wide group of 
progressive thinkers and rural Americans.187 Many declared 
electrical service “a right”;188 Franklin D. Roosevelt called it “a 
definite necessity” and considered its profusion a key 
component of New Deal social and economic reforms.189 
Electrification beyond the city required a strategy beyond 
public utility law. Under no legal compulsion to operate outside 
their service territories, utilities not only refused to extend 
service into unprofitable regions but also fought farmers’ 
efforts to form their own local electric cooperatives.190 
Ultimately this strategy backfired, as increasing frustration 
with utilities’ monopolistic behavior combined with the 
hardships of the Great Depression to turn public opinion in 
favor of large-scale public power projects during the 1930s.191 
Consequently, Congress passed legislation creating the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933 and the Rural 
Electrification Administration (REA) in 1936,192 which together 
 
 185. NYE, supra note 171, at 171. 
 186. NYE, supra note 27, at 287; MOSHER ET AL., supra note 174, at xiv 
(comparing U.S. progress on rural electrification unfavorably to Germany, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Ontario). 
 187. See, e.g., NYE, supra note 27, at 304; SARAH T. PHILLIPS, THIS LAND, THIS 
NATION 21–26, 35 (2007) (documenting how electrification functioned as part of a 
larger effort to relieve rural poverty and promote efficient resource use); Jean 
Christie, Giant Power: A Progressive Proposal of the Nineteen-Twenties, 96 PENN. 
MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 480, 485 (1972) (finding that one of the “leading 
theme[s] of the arguments for government diffusion of electric power” was 
“concern for rural life”).  
 188. NYE, supra note 27, at 301 (discussing the address of L.J. Taber to a 
1920s National Electric Lighting Association convention on rural electrification); 
ROY TALBERT, JR., FDR’S UTOPIAN: ARTHUR MORGAN OF THE TVA 147 (1987) 
(describing TVA head David Lilienthal’s “vigorous campaign on behalf of 
electricity as a natural right for all Americans”). 
 189. NYE, supra note 27, at 304; TALBERT, supra note 188, at 118, 128; see also 
Christie, supra note 187, at 494–95 (discussing Gifford Pinchot’s call for greater 
government intervention to ensure that electric power would “be made 
incomparably the greatest material blessing in human history”).  
 190. NYE, supra note 27, at 292, 308; Bruce Wyman, The Obligations of Public 
Services to Make Connections, 22 HARV. L. REV. 564, 571 (1909). 
 191. NYE, supra note 27, at 304.  
 192. See Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58 (1933) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2012)) [hereinafter TVA Act]. The REA 
was first created by Executive Order in 1935, and later statutorily authorized and 
expanded. See Exec. Order No. 7037 (May 11, 1935) (adopted under the authority 
9. 88.3 WELTON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2017  7:27 PM 
2017] CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION 615 
brought electricity to most farms throughout the country. 
These statutes’ central focus was on empowering rural 
Americans to build their own electricity networks.193 The TVA 
Act did so by prioritizing public purchasers in selling the 
electricity generated by its dams, thereby providing a reliable 
source of cheap power for consumers not served by utilities.194 
The Act also gave the TVA’s governing board authority to 
extend loans to help municipalities and electric cooperatives 
construct and operate the transmission and distribution lines 
necessary to access TVA power.195 
Similarly, the REA operated primarily through the 
assurance of loans provided at the government rate of 
interest.196 Rural electric cooperatives, organized and 
democratically controlled by participating residents, received 
the vast majority of these loans.197 These cooperatives proved 
exceedingly successful in marshaling the resources necessary 
to electrify rural America: within twenty years, they had wired 
ninety percent of their service territories.198 The cooperative 
structure also served participatory functions: thousands of 
farmers and their families would gather to discuss their 
 
of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, ch. 48, 49 Stat. 115 (1935)); 
Rural Electrification Act of 1936, ch. 432, 49 Stat. 1363 (May 20, 1936) (codified at 
7 U.S.C. § 901) [hereinafter REA Act]. Many states also undertook rural 
electrification efforts around this time. See RURAL ELEC. ADMIN, ELECTRIC POWER 
ON THE FARM 143 (David Cushman Cole ed., 1936) (noting state authorities in 
North and South Carolina, Alabama, and Tennessee and other programs in 
Wisconsin and Minnesota) [hereinafter ON THE FARM]. 
 193. Cf. PHILLIPS, supra note 187, at 35 (arguing that electrification was 
driven by the question of how to distribute the wealth of industrialism and 
modernity more equitably).  
 194. See TVA Act Preamble, § 11; see also Joseph P. Mentor, Jr., The Preference 
Clause Revisited: Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility District v. Johnson and the 
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. 
REV. 413, 416–17 (1983). 
 195. TVA Act §§ 12–12a.  
 196. See REA Act §§ 2–4; U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AND TELEPHONE PROGRAMS 1 (1983).  
 197. See Jim Cooper, Electric Co-operatives: From New Deal to Bad Deal?, 45 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 346, 346 n.77 (2008); ON THE FARM, supra note 192, at 
136, 157 (noting that loans were typically not made for less than $40,000 for 
approximately forty miles of line, the smallest project considered financially 
feasible, which caused rural residents to have to canvass and campaign for 
cooperative participants); see also THE NEXT GREATEST THING, supra note 28, at 
81–87 (describing co-ops’ formation process). 
 198. Cooper, supra note 197, at 347 (“No private companies had ever stretched 
copper wire faster, over longer distances, or been a conduit of more federal 
subsidy dollars.”).  
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cooperative’s finances and operations during day-long 
sessions.199 These meetings had “a spiritual meaning to people 
who were so long denied the benefits of modern energy.”200 
Both the TVA and the REA relied on private sector support 
to create economically sustainable models that could broaden 
access. In conjunction with national appliance manufacturers, 
the agencies designed and promoted more affordable versions 
of popular electronic appliances for rural residents, marketed 
under the logo “Electricity for All.”201 The agencies also 
extended loans directly to farms to assist in the wiring of 
houses and outbuildings and the purchase of electrical 
equipment.202 These sales increased electricity demand, 
allowing cooperatives to pay for their newly constructed 
transmission lines while keeping prices low.203 
For rural residents, electricity proved transformational on 
a physical and more profound level. In addition to easing the 
enormous burdens of hauling wood and water, electricity 
brought connections to the world beyond the farm, powering 
radios and eliminating the challenge of reading by kerosene 
lamp.204 One widely printed poem called rural electrification 
“democracy at work,” proclaiming: “out of the darkness, light, 
out of despair / the new fulfillment of equality.”205 
As a legal matter, the public power mandates of the 1930s 
reflected a societal refusal to allow the boundaries of energy 
access to be determined by the economics of public utility 
companies or the reach of public utility law. These programs 
treated electricity as an important foundational good, 
necessary for participation in the nation’s economy and in its 
democratic traditions. But it is important not to overstate their 
 
 199. See DAVID E. LILIENTHAL, DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH 19–20 (1944). 
 200. Id. at 20. 
 201. See TALBERT, supra note 188, at 145–48; NYE, supra note 27, at 318; ON 
THE FARM, supra note 192, at 159. The Electric Home and Farm Authority 
(EHFA), created by the TVA, supplied these loans to families. See Exec. Order No. 
6514 (Dec. 19, 1933).  
 202. See REA Act § 5; ON THE FARM, supra note 192, at 158. 
 203. Field, supra note 29, at 33; see also LILIENTHAL, supra note 199, at 22 
(explaining the TVA’s strategy in this regard); THE NEXT GREATEST THING, supra 
note 28, at 61 (explaining Morris Cooke’s argument that the key to rural 
electrification’s success was to create large average use of current, in order to keep 
rates low enough “to effect the coveted social advantages”).  
 204. See CARO, supra note 27; THE NEXT GREATEST THING, supra note 28.  
 205. NYE, supra note 27, at 325–26 (discussing a poem on rural electrification 
written by Walter Paschall).  
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idealism: While those behind the public power movement often 
spoke of electricity as a right, the Acts themselves only went so 
far as to enable more Americans to organize themselves into 
groups able to access reasonably priced electricity.206 And the 
Acts did not reach all Americans: those rural areas that could 
not, for economic or other reasons, organize themselves into 
viable cooperatives continued to be left out of electrification’s 
gains.207 Public power thus widened affordable electricity 
access, but did not disrupt its status as a commodity for sale 
only to those who could afford to pay something for it. 
C. Creating a Floor or Creating Rationality? The Debates 
of the 1970s 
The model of public utility commissions combined with 
rural electric cooperatives proved adequate to address equity 
concerns within energy law for many decades.208 But in the 
1970s, electricity rates finally began to rise,209 putting pressure 
on electricity law to consider equity in new ways.210 Long-
dormant questions over cost distribution among consumers 
came to the fore, discussed in conversations over “rate 
design.”211 
 
 206. See supra notes 192–203 and accompanying text. 
 207. See, e.g., CARO, supra note 27, at 502–03 (describing why electricity took 
decades longer to come to remote Texas Hill Country); see also Alysa Landry, Not 
Alone in the Dark: Navaho Nation’s Lack of Electricity Problem, INDIAN COUNTRY 
MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 11, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
2015/02/11/not-alone-dark-navajo-nations-lack-electricity-problem-159135 
[https://perma.cc/L89S-Z86M] (documenting ongoing challenges in connecting 
thousands of Navajo Nation residents to the electric grid). 
 208. See Peter Z. Grossman, The Zenith of the Natural Monopoly System, in 
THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY 89, 101 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole 
eds., 2003) (“[T]he natural monopoly system outweighed the costs in the period 
between 1945 and 1965 for the following reasons: predictability, the direction of 
electricity prices, path dependence, and transition costs.”); see also Paul Joskow,  
Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public 
Utility Price Regulation, 17 J. L. & ECON. 291, 312 (1974). 
 209. Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy Model for Representation of Low-Income 
Intervenors in State Public Utility Proceedings, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 640 (1990) 
(“Nationally, electric rates rose ninety percent in the five years after 1970.”).  
 210. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 12; Joskow, supra note 208, at 312–13 
(arguing that a confluence of factors “wreaked havoc” on ratemaking, including 
inflation, rising interest rates, increased environmental concern, and energy 
shortages).  
 211. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 19–20. Concurrently, the number of utility 
rate cases soared and the public began to intervene in commission proceedings in 
much greater numbers. See Krieger, supra note 209, at 640; Joskow, supra note 
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An influential 1971 article by Richard Posner highlighted 
the prevalence of “internal subsidies” in regulated industries as 
a form of “taxation by regulation.”212 Posner’s article illustrated 
the ways in which regulation performed “distributive and 
allocative chores,” particularly through uniform rates charged 
to consumers with different costs of service.213 Attention to 
internal subsidies caused some economists and 
conservationists to unite in pressing for regulated prices to 
better reflect the costs of providing energy at the particular 
time and place it was demanded.214 Such changes would reduce 
electricity demand, particularly at peak periods, thus 
improving the environment and increasing economic welfare.215 
But these goals collided with the objective of helping 
consumers to manage their skyrocketing energy bills, 
especially as it became clear that rising rates did not equally 
harm all consumers. Rising energy prices caused low-income 
households to devote eleven to fourteen percent of their income 
to home energy costs, as compared to an average of three 
percent.216 This disparity either caused lower-income 
households to lose service or crowded out their ability to 
purchase other basic goods.217 Advocates on behalf of energy as 
a basic good or necessity therefore pressed for reduced prices 
for those struggling to pay their electricity bills.218 
These debates crystallized the “fairness versus efficiency” 
contest in public utility law (and well beyond), which pitted the 
 
208, at 299; William T. Gormley, Jr., Public Advocacy in Public Utility 
Commission Proceedings, 17 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 446, 446 (1981). 
 212. Posner, supra note 21, at 22.  Posner argued that “internal subsidies” 
resulted from the fact that services like electricity were priced equally for all 
consumers within particular classes, despite the fact that individual households 
and businesses actually cost different amounts to serve, such that some customers 
were non-transparently subsidizing others. Id.  
 213. Id. at 23. 
 214. See Joskow, supra note 208, at 314, 317; PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 20; 
see also Kahn, supra note 180, at xxviii (tracing commissions’ rising interest in 
“economic efficiency” to discourage inefficient consumption and reduce capacity 
expansion); Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public 
Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 966, 966 (1975) (defining policy makers’ equity 
concerns as centering on the question of whether a proposed price structure 
“unduly” favors certain consumers by resulting in a cross-subsidy). 
 215. Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 60, at 381. 
 216. Higgins & Lutzenhiser, supra note 32, at 470.  
 217. Id.; Diana Hernández & Stephen Bird, Energy Burden and the Need for 
Integrated Low-Income Housing and Energy Policy, 2 POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 5, 
11–13 (2010).  
 218. Higgins & Lutzenhiser, supra note 32, at 472–73. 
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two visions of the purpose of energy law against each other: one 
focused on rationalizing rates so everyone paid her own way, 
and the other focused on differential treatment based on ability 
to pay.219 At its heart, this debate concerned the legal question 
of when discrimination among consumers is “due” or “just”: for 
one group, it was just when discrimination remedied efficiency 
failures; for another group, it was just when it helped maintain 
affordable electricity for all. More broadly, this debate called 
into question the role of regulatory commissions: were they to 
act as a substitute for competition, trying to produce the 
outcomes that a theoretical market would, but for the existence 
of a natural monopoly?220 Or were they to play a more 
capacious role in the provisioning of basic services that society 
refused to leave to the market?221 
Neither side of this debate fully triumphed. The major 
federal energy statute passed at the time, the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),222 reflects 
lawmakers’ refusal to choose between fairness and efficiency. 
The Act required state commissions to eliminate cross-
subsidization among classes of electric consumers and to 
consider adopting time-of-use rates that varied by time of day 
and season.223 But PURPA tempered its push towards 
economic rationality by requiring states to consider the 
adoption of “lifeline rates,” which would give elderly and low-
income consumers a certain quantity of basic service below 
cost.224 
 
 219. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 20; ZAJAC, supra note 20, at 2–3 (explaining 
that public utility pricing represents “100 years” of “deal[ing] in practical terms 
with the tradeoff” between equity and efficiency); Trebing, supra note 21, at 17; 
BONBRIGHT, supra note 21, at 121–34. 
 220. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 173 (“[R]egulation is a substitute for 
competition and should attempt to put the utility sector under the same restraints 
competition places on the industrial sector.”); BONBRIGHT, supra note 21, at 109  
(“Regulation can . . . be regarded as a substitute for competition—probably as an 
inferior substitute.”).  
 221. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 1651–58 (explaining how understandings of 
the role of regulatory commissions evolved during this period). 
 222. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95–617, 92 Stat. 
3117 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)).  
 223. See 16 U.S.C. § 2621; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-543, at 10 (1978), as 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7673, 7679 (explaining that the bill aims to move 
utilities towards pricing electricity “at true cost” to encourage conservation).  
 224. 16 U.S.C. § 2624; PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 449; see also Lester W. 
Baxter, Electricity Policies for Low-Income Households, 26 ENERGY POL’Y 247, 248 
(1998). PURPA also established recommended standards that prohibited 
terminating electric service for non-payment during periods “especially dangerous 
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State regulators followed PURPA’s lead in mixing 
efficiency and fairness reforms. Many commissions adopted 
“inverted block rate” pricing, which punished large consumers 
by charging more for consumption above certain levels.225 
These rates responded to conservationists’ concerns that 
energy scarcity should be reflected in rates,226 but also 
implicitly protected low-income consumers by charging the 
lowest price for power adequate to cover basic needs.227 Lifeline 
rates proved more controversial: While some states, including 
California and New York, adopted such rates, they remained 
difficult to implement within the confines of public utility 
law.228 It was hard to determine who deserved a lifeline, and 
onto whom the costs of lifeline rate provision should be 
shifted.229 For this reason, many commissions rejected lifeline 
rates as falling outside the purview of what public utility law 
was set up to do.230 
Separately from these public utility debates and spurred 
by skyrocketing energy bills, in 1981 Congress adopted a 
federally-funded program designed to mitigate energy 
inequality called the “Low Income Home Energy Assistance 
Program” (LIHEAP).231 LIHEAP, which is still in existence 
today, uses block grants to states to assist low-income 
households in meeting their home energy costs, although 
 
to health.” See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2623, 2625(g) (2012). 
 225. KAHN, supra note 180, at xxx–xxxi.  
 226. Id. at xxxi. Some commissions also began to move towards time-of-use 
tariffs for large industrial and commercial customers, who had the metering 
infrastructure necessary to utilize these more complex tariff structures. See 
Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 60, at 382. 
 227. KAHN, supra note 180, at xxx–xxxi.  
 228. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 449–51; Krieger, supra note 209, at 663–65 
(describing contentious implementation of lifeline rates in California, where “most 
of the [commission] staff objected to the concept” but consumer groups succeeded 
in building a coalition “involving senior citizen groups, labor unions, and 
environmental organizations”).  
 229. PHILLIPS, supra note 21, at 450 (explaining the challenges of including 
industrial ratepayers in paying for lifeline rates, given the countervailing 
argument that including this class might increase the price of other basic goods, 
also harming low-income consumers).  
 230. See, e.g., Rate Concessions to Poor Persons & Senior Citizens, 14 
P.U.R.4th 87, 90 (Or. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan. 16, 1976) (finding no authority for 
commissioner to “discriminate between customers on the basis of income levels,” 
and collecting decisions from other states reaching the same conclusion); see also 
Trebing, supra note 21, at 33 (explaining that commissions were reluctant to 
adopt redistributive rate structures).  
 231. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97–35, 95 Stat. 357 
(Aug. 13, 1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621–8630 (2012)).  
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funding has never been near sufficient to cover demand.232 
Contemporaneously with LIHEAP, federal and state 
governments also began to direct funding towards low-income 
“weatherization” efforts, which provide home energy audits, 
storm windows, insulation, and other technologies to low-
income households.233 Weatherization programs have proven 
an enduring alternative to direct rate subsidization, as they 
permanently reduce energy costs in low-income households,234 
which often prove among the least efficient energy users.235 In 
this way, such policies might prove important models for 
policies that attempt to spread additional clean energy 
technologies more equally. 
D. Restructuring & Low-Income Consumers 
Widening Americans’ access to affordable power began as a 
Progressive and New Deal era project, consonant with the 
ideologies of those times. But by the end of the twentieth 
century and in a very different political climate, regulators 
 
 232. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621–8622 (defining “home energy” as residential 
heating and cooling). Each state establishes its own LIHEAP program guidelines 
and distributes its funds through local agencies. The maximum income eligibility 
is the greater of 150 percent of the federal poverty level or 60 percent of the state 
median income. See 42 U.S.C. § 8624 (2012). A 1995 study found that only 20 
percent of the 30 million eligible households received any LIHEAP assistance. 
Higgins & Lutzenhiser, supra note 32, at 469. For a more detailed discussion of 
LIHEAP, see LIBBY PERL, CONG. RES. SERV., LIHEAP: PROGRAM AND FUNDING  7 
(2013); Behles, supra note 13, at 27–31.  
 233. See Higgins & Lutzenhiser, supra note 32, at 472. States can use up to 
fifteen percent of their LIHEAP grants towards weatherization efforts, and the 
U.S. Department of Energy also runs its own Weatherization Assistance Program 
(WAP) targeted at low-income households. See The Energy Conservation in 
Existing Buildings Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–385, title IV, 90 Stat. 1150 (1976) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6851 et seq.). 
 234. See Baxter, supra note 224, at 249; see also Scott, supra note 135, at 389 
(suggesting that commissions adopted energy efficiency policies primarily to lower 
rates). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocated $5 billion 
to the WAP. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LOW INCOME HOME 
ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 39–
40 (2011).  
 235. A 2016 study found that low-income households pay on average $1.41 in 
energy costs per square foot, whereas the average non-low-income household pays 
only $1.17 per square foot, indicating that low-income households “reside in less 
efficient housing.” See ARIEL DREHOBL & LAUREN ROSS, LIFTING THE HIGH 
ENERGY BURDEN IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CITIES (2016), 
http://energyefficiencyforall.org/sites/default/files/Lifting%20the%20High%20Ener
gy%20Burden_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2JX-W2DH].  
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across the country viewed it as central to their mission. They 
demonstrated this enduring commitment during industry 
upheavals in the 1990s, when “retail restructuring” changed 
the basic model of electricity provisioning in many states.236 
Retail restructuring followed a series of reforms in federal 
law that increased competition in electricity markets.237 
Buoyed by this enhanced competition in wholesale electricity 
markets, many states decided to allow competition among 
retail electricity suppliers as well.238 Under retail 
restructuring, consumers would be able to choose their 
electricity supplier from a competitive pool, with only 
distribution service remaining a traditionally regulated 
monopoly.239 Competition created through this model would, in 
theory, lower energy prices by allowing consumers to shop for 
the best deal.240 
One of the greatest obstacles to retail restructuring quickly 
proved to be the question of how to ensure continued affordable 
universal service within a competitive marketplace, where 
retail suppliers could screen out those customers considered 
risky or high-cost.241 In some places, these concerns caused 
regulators to abandon altogether plans to open electricity 
provisioning to competition.242 In those states where retail 
 
 236. See Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity 
Markets in the United States, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND 
CHALLENGES 5–10 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005). 
 237. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, 106 Stat. 2776, §§ 
721–22 (1992) (relevant portions codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(j)–(k) (2012)); FERC 
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities 18 C.F.R. §§ 35, 385 (1996); see also generally 
David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 765  (2008) (describing the restructuring process and exploring its purpose, 
promise, and limits). 
 238. By 1998 more than half of states had opened proceedings to consider retail 
restructuring. See BARBARA ALEXANDER, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROPOSALS FOR 
RETAIL ELECTRIC COMPETITION: MODEL LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS 2 (1996). 
 239. Rossi, supra note 21, at 1294 (observing that states created “de jure 
monopol[ies] for distribution, subject to fairly traditional regulation”). 
 240. See ALEXANDER, supra note 238, at 3; Rossi, supra note 21, at 1281 (“It is 
well-recognized that, in order to maximize the benefits of competition in wholesale 
power markets, retail access to competition for all customers will be necessary.”). 
 241. See Rossi, supra note 21, at 1288, 1299–1300 (suggesting that defining the 
“scope of extraordinary service obligations and their financing” was critical to the 
success of retail competition).  
 242. Id. at 1290. Regulators also worried about losing other consumer 
protections, including protections regarding credit terms, contract terms, late fees, 
security deposits, and disconnection and connection practices. See ALEXANDER, 
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restructuring proceeded, the challenge of assuring continued 
affordable service for all consumers assumed a central position 
on regulatory dockets.243 
Thus, even two decades into a deregulatory revolution in 
the United States,244 no state proved willing to leave electricity 
to the market.245  Instead, each state pursuing restructuring 
adopted some variant of “provider of last resort” service, which 
created an obligation to serve those who otherwise could not 
obtain service.246 Restructuring legislation also typically 
included some means of continued funding for low-income 
assistance programs, typically by assessing a “system benefits 
charge” on all distribution customers.247 
Retail restructuring has had a rocky rollout and 
reception.248 Its successes and failures remain a topic of some 
debate, and one that will not be explored in depth here.249 For 
 
supra note 238, at 4. 
 243. See Rossi, supra note 21, at 1292–94 (collecting states’ views on the 
importance of maintaining protections for low-income consumers during 
restructuring).  
 244. See Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 165–68 (2001) (situating electricity deregulation 
and restructuring within broader deregulatory trends in telecommunications, 
airlines, railroads, and natural gas); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, 98 
COLUM L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1998) (describing the paradigm shift in regulated 
industries law).  
 245. Cf. Rossi, supra note 21, at 1291 (“Without a duty to serve, the electricity 
market might operate much like other deregulated markets, such as trucking and 
banking, which rely on contractual obligations and general consumer protection 
laws to ensure service delivery.”).  
 246. This obligation attaches either to the incumbent distribution utility or 
certain retail suppliers. Compare 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2807(e)(3) (2015) 
(distribution company), with Electricity Options: Provider of Last Resort, TEX. 
PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.puc.texas.gov/consumer/electricity/polr.aspx 
(last visited June 22, 2015) [https://perma.cc/G3CW-LBXF] (selected retail 
supplier within each region). See also Rossi, supra note 21, at 1311–12.   
 247. See Rossi, supra note 21, at 1241. System benefits charges also cover other 
“public benefits,” including energy efficiency and demand-side-management 
programs. See ALEXANDER, supra note 238, at 4; Scott, supra note 135, at 388.  
 248. California’s infamous challenges with its restructuring design, which 
created widespread power outages and left the market ripe for manipulation, 
caused many states to reconsider restructuring. Of the twenty-four states that 
instigated electricity restructuring, seven have suspended it. See Timothy P. 
Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 
YALE J. ON REG. 471, 471 (2002); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Status of Electricity 
Restructuring by State (Sept. 2010) http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/ 
restructuring/restructure_elect.html [https://perma.cc/UD7P-VEF8]. 
 249. See generally Spence, supra note 237; Peter Navarro & Michael Shames, 
Electricity Deregulation: Lessons Learned from California, 24 ENERGY L.J. 33 
(2003). 
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present purposes, it is important merely to note that even in 
the midst of a profound legal shift in how regulators conceived 
of the relationship between consumers and electricity supply, 
affordable access remained a core consideration. Electricity 
remained too foundational to human flourishing to be left to 
the whims of the market, available only to those who could 
negotiate to obtain it. 
E. Summing the Parts 
It is certainly true, as many scholars have suggested, that 
electricity law provides no ready formula for balancing fairness 
and efficiency.250 But the laws and policies adopted during the 
twentieth century project of electrification demonstrate an 
enduring commitment to the goal of enabling widespread 
access to affordable electricity. This goal was furthered at 
certain points by a focus on efficiency—as in the case of rate 
design reforms in the 1970s—and at other points by a focus on 
fairness—as in the case of providing discounted power to assist 
rural electrification efforts and, later, keeping all consumers 
connected to the grid during times of energy price spikes.251 
One reason that electricity law has not settled for an 
exclusive focus on low rates is that these have never been an 
end in themselves, just as electricity has never been a “good” in 
and of itself.252 The justification for governmental control over 
electricity has been its ability to lift Americans out of drudgery 
and into a life where engagement with society—on terms of the 
individual’s choosing—is possible. In their focus on access and 
affordability, our electricity laws reflect a marriage between 
concepts of electricity as a necessity for full participation in 
American life and as a utilitarian tool to help “grow the 
American pie” by inducing widespread consumerism.253 While 
 
 250. See Trebing, supra note 21, at 31 (noting a “tendency toward averaging 
conflicting claims”); Posner, supra note 21, at 44 (finding “no objective basis for 
balancing off distributive benefits against allocative costs”).  
 251. Cf. Spence, supra note 157, at 39 (observing that “[s]ince its inception 
more than a century ago, modern American energy law – public utility law and 
environmental law – has sought to reconcile . . . conflicting impulses [towards 
efficiency and fairness]”).  
 252. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
 253. Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 103 (1994) (“How to make 
the pie larger, not how to divide the existing pie, is the crux of the long-range and 
primarily significant problem.”); LILIENTHAL, supra note 199, at 75–76 (describing 
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only in extreme cases have we been willing to provide an 
energy “handout,”254 lawmakers have eagerly used law to 
expand the number of people capable of enjoying the life-
transforming qualities of electricity, and have been tolerant of 
some pricing inefficiencies that appear to support this aim. 
III.  FROM GRID ACCESS TO THE PARTICIPATORY GRID 
Electricity law’s historical embrace of “widespread access 
to cheap power” as a means of ensuring equity presents a 
challenging precedent for the current era. This animating goal 
worked when consuming more power was presumed to lead 
inexorably to a stronger economy and a stronger democracy.255 
But it is no longer tenable in the era of climate change, whose 
global, intergenerational, and domestic inequities suggest the 
need for more complex understandings of energy equity. 
The equity debates over clean energy highlighted in Part I 
have proceeded largely along traditional fault lines within 
public utility law: the project of adopting reforms to induce 
more efficient, effective participation in the grid256 is counter-
balanced by the risks such reforms might pose to low-income 
consumers. The reality is far more complex, given widespread 
agreement that climate change will harm the poor more than 
the wealthy.257 In light of this fact, there appears a certain 
absurdity in halting clean energy policies—policies designed to 
stem the tide of climate change—in the name of equity. 
This Part begins by parsing the complex equity questions 
that electricity regulators confront as they consider using clean 
energy policies to address climate change. Section A shows that 
 
the importance of electrification in providing a sense of empowerment and 
participation). 
 254. Sovacool and Dworkin explain that many states are quite limited in their 
exceptions to shutoffs: They give the example of Vermont, where residential 
customers can only avoid shutoff outside of the coldest winter months by 
furnishing a physician’s certificate asserting the resident would suffer “an 
immediate and serious health hazard by the disconnection.” SOVACOOL & 
DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 223. 
 255. See supra note 32. 
 256. “Efficient” in the sense that the participatory grid is a cost-effective way to 
induce the kinds of changes in electricity consumption that climate change 
demands. Cf. DOUGLAS & ZAFAR, supra note 53, at 3 (“Customer participation, 
more than the actions of the utilities or of the regulators, is critical to meet 
California’s greenhouse gas emission goals in a cost-effective manner.”). 
 257. See infra notes 259, 262–268.  
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there is good reason to believe that halting or slowing clean 
energy also will seriously harm low-income consumers within 
the United States, making “equity” a poor justification for 
impeding clean energy policies. Section B then argues that if 
electricity regulators choose to pursue grid participation as a 
way to mitigate the impacts of climate change, then their long-
standing regulatory duty to ensure widespread access requires 
a widening of the range of people able to participate in the grid. 
Section C defends this conclusion as not only in line with a 
century-old effort to maintain or enhance the affordability of 
electricity, but also as part of the long tradition of using 
electricity to empower Americans to become active members of 
the economy and polity. 
A. Climate and Energy Laws’ Distinct but Overlapping 
Equities 
Domestic regulators—such as public utilities 
commissions—have a difficult task in figuring out how to 
balance the overlapping concerns of climate justice and clean 
energy justice.258 The geographical and temporal dimensions of 
climate change equity make it hard to square with domestic 
regulatory frameworks. The poor within developing countries, 
particularly those in Africa and Southeast Asia, will be most 
negatively impacted by climate change.259 And although we are 
already experiencing the negative effects of climate change, 
climate disruptions anticipated in the future dwarf the effects 
of today, such that the future poor stand to benefit more than 
the present poor from policies designed to mitigate climate 
 
 258. See ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 101, 
144 (2010); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1591–96 (2011).  
 259. These disparate impacts stem from geographical disparities in climate 
change’s impacts, as well as settlement and livelihood patterns. See Christopher 
B. Field et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 6–9 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC 
WORKING GROUP II]; Tim Hayward, Climate Change and Ethics, in 2 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 843, 843 (Dec. 2012); Steve Vanderheiden, Climate Change, 
Fairness, & Equity, in ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2 (2008); ENCYCLICAL LETTER LAUDATO SI’ OF THE HOLY FATHER 
FRANCIS, ON CARE FOR OUR COMMON HOME 21–22 (2015). 
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change.260 
The inter-temporal and international dimensions of 
climate change have long made domestic progress on climate 
change mitigation challenging. That said, these far-reaching 
equity debates do not comprise the central challenge in clean 
energy justice. In the debates over clean energy’s equities, 
regulators are concerned primarily with the disparate impacts 
that clean energy policies present for the present poor as 
compared to the present rich—or, in other words, with more 
traditional questions of access within electricity law.261 These 
equity concerns, once properly contextualized, are far less 
intractable than the intergenerational and international equity 
challenges that plague climate negotiations. 
Moreover, there are compelling equity-based reasons for 
energy regulators—even operating within their mandated focus 
on near-term equity concerns within the United States—to 
value moving clean energy policies forward. Although it is less 
frequently observed, climate change will also produce disparate 
impacts within the United States. 
Experts broadly agree that climate change will harm the 
poor within the United States more than the affluent along 
three dimensions, although assessing the magnitude of these 
disparities remains challenging.262 First, poor and minority 
 
 260. See, e.g., POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 258, at 144. Indeed, the poor of 
today cannot benefit in the short term from carbon mitigation as such, because we 
have already emitted enough carbon to “lock in” warming effects for some time 
into the future. STERN, supra note 23, at 156 (“Only a small portion of the cost of 
climate change between now and 2050 can be realistically avoided, because of 
inertia in the climate system.”); Lisa V. Alexander et al., Summary for 
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 27 (2013) (“Most aspects of 
climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions of CO2 are 
stopped.”) [hereinafter IPCC WORKING GROUP I]. 
 261. See generally supra Part I (explaining the ways in which regulators’ 
concerns over the disparate burdens of clean energy policies are impeding their 
advancement). 
 262. See, e.g., IPCC WORKING GROUP II, supra note 259, at 12 (“Risks are 
unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and 
communities in countries at all levels of development.”); U.S. National Climate 
Assessment, Highlights: Climate Change Effects in the U.S., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE 
RES. PROGRAM, http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report (last visited Nov. 22, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/NQH7-NVEF] (“Certain groups of people are more vulnerable to 
the range of climate change related health impacts, including the elderly, 
children, the poor, and the sick.”); ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ & KAREN AKERLOF, 
RACE, ETHNICITY AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2010); STERN, 
supra note 23, at 5(10) (“Low-income households will be disproportionately 
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communities are likely to be disproportionately impacted by 
climate change-related disasters, including heat waves and 
storms,263 due to factors including lack of air conditioning, 
greater prevalence of pre-existing health conditions, location 
and condition of housing, inadequate access to transportation, 
relatively greater rates of under-insurance, and concentration 
in strenuous occupations.264 Indeed, Hurricanes Sandy and 
Katrina already brought to the public’s attention the ways in 
which domestic disasters—which are likely increasing in 
severity and frequency due to climate change—cause disparate 
impacts according to class.265 
Second, climate change will increase the price of basic 
necessities, including water, energy, and food,266 causing lower-
 
affected by increases in extreme weather events. Those on lower incomes often 
live in higher-risk areas, marginal lands and poor quality housing.”). It is 
notoriously challenging to predictively model how particular changes in 
greenhouse gas concentrations will cause earth systems to respond, and how these 
changes will in turn impact global, regional, and local economies. For these 
reasons, economists have not yet been able to offer much quantitative insight into 
the differential impacts that climate change will have on low-income populations 
within countries. See STERN, supra note 23, at 143; IPCC WORKING GROUP I, 
supra note 260, at 13–14; IPCC WORKING GROUP II, supra note 259, at 20 (noting 
difficulty of estimating economic impacts from climate change); Masur & Posner, 
supra note 258, at 1560 (describing our climate-society models as “extraordinarily 
crude”). 
 263. See RACHEL MORELLO-FROSCH ET AL., THE CLIMATE GAP: INEQUALITIES 
IN HOW CLIMATE CHANGE HURTS AMERICANS & HOW TO CLOSE THE GAP 7–12 
(2009). 
 264. See SETH B. SHONKOFF ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND EQUITY 
IMPACTS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE AND MITIGATION POLICIES IN CALIFORNIA: A 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 16–17 (2009) (reviewing a wide body of scientific 
literature reaching these conclusions particularly as they relate to California); 
CONG. BLACK CAUCUS FOUND., INC., AFRICAN AMERICANS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
AN UNEQUAL BURDEN 3 (2004), http://rprogress.org/publications/2004/CBCF_ 
REPORT_F.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QGS-9TQT].  
 265. See generally Sherrie Armstrong Tomlinson, Note, No New Orleanians 
Left Behind: An Examination of the Disparate Impact of Hurricane Katrina, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 1153 (2006); Pratt Ctr. for Cmty. Dev., Toward an Informed 
Rebuilding: Documenting Sandy’s Impacts, http://www.prattcenter.net/research/ 
toward-informed-rebuilding-documenting-sandys-impacts [https://perma.cc/C4QF-
HCQT] (collecting maps showing the disparate impact of Hurricane Sandy on low-
income New Yorkers).  
 266. MORELLO-FROSCH ET AL., supra note 263 at 15. A Natural Resource 
Defense Council study found that under a business-as-usual scenario, climate 
change will cause energy costs to rise $28 billion by 2025 and $141 billion by 
2100, and water sector costs to rise $200 billion by 2025 and $950 billion by 2100. 
FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, THE COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE: 
WHAT WE’LL PAY IF GLOBAL WARMING CONTINUES UNCHECKED  v (2008); 
SHONKOF ET AL., supra note 264, at 9–10. 
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income households to face difficult budgetary tradeoffs between 
feeding their families and paying their utility bills.267 And 
third, the poor will experience the greatest disruptions in 
employment opportunities, as they are disproportionately 
employed in agriculture and tourism, the two economic sectors 
most impacted by climate change.268 
These inequitable burdens should at least raise serious 
questions about a strategy of halting clean energy policies on 
grounds of equity. To be sure, these impacts will harm future 
U.S. low-income households more than present-day ones.269 
But given the rapid scale of changes, “today’s poor” are also, to 
a large extent, the poor of a climate-changed tomorrow.270 
Thus, when the poor of today pay something towards 
addressing climate change, they themselves and especially 
their children and grandchildren stand to gain in the future. 
This fact appears to be well understood and valued by many of 
“today’s poor” in the United States. Surveys consistently show 
greater support among minority communities for action on 
climate change—even if it will prove costly—than among the 
American public more generally.271 These preferences deserve 
 
 267. See David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-
Emissions Control and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 
1108 (2010) (“When energy prices rose 42.1% from 2000 to 2005, families with 
annual incomes between $15,000 and $30,000 reduced their food spending by 
10%.”); Hernández  & Bird, supra note 217, at 6 (“With energy costs increasingly 
on the rise, low-income families are often left to make hard choices about whether 
to spend their money on food or energy.”); see generally Jayanta Bhattacharya et 
al., Heat or Eat? Cold-Weather Shocks and Nutrition in Poor American Families, 
93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1149 (2003).  
 268. MORELLO-FROSCH ET AL., supra note 263, at 15–16.  
 269. Cf. POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 258, at 26–27 (arguing that 
“[r]educing carbon emissions is not a way to help today’s poor”).  
 270. See Arden Rowell, Time in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
1215, 1215, 1234–35 (2014) (observing that “time flow creates systematic line-
drawing challenges for decision makers who must distinguish between present 
and future events,” as there is in fact no moment at which the “next generation” 
arrives). 
 271. See Coral Davenport, Climate Is Big Issue for Hispanics, and Personal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
02/10/us/politics/climate-change-is-of-growing-personal-concern-to-us-hispanics-
poll-finds.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XY7E-Y3ZB] (describing results of a recent 
survey finding that Hispanics “are more likely than non-Hispanic whites to view 
global warming as a problem that affects them personally” and “are more likely to 
support policies, such as taxes and regulations on greenhouse gas pollution, aimed 
at curbing it”); Harry Enten, The Racial Gap on Global Warming, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 23, 2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/the-racial-
gap-on-global-warming/ [https://perma.cc/S63W-DRUV] (reporting that non-white 
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to be taken seriously. 
Moreover, the inter-temporal equity challenges of climate 
mitigation policies can be reduced if policies are designed to 
serve multiple ends, such that they contemporaneously work to 
cut carbon and reduce inequality.272 Of course, experts 
frequently make this suggestion; it forms much of the basis of 
the popular concept of, “sustainable development.”273 But 
usually, given lawmakers hesitance to transform these ideals 
into concrete and binding law, there is little in the way of a 
firm legal commitment in which to root such multifaceted 
efforts, causing reality to fall short of expectations.274 There is, 
then, a strange and underappreciated alchemy to U.S. climate 
change efforts proceeding predominantly through energy law: 
as demonstrated in the previous section, electricity law 
provides its own long-standing legal commitment to equity in 
which to ground an effort to spread clean energy’s benefits 
more broadly. 
B. Affordability via Participation and the Regulatory Duty 
of the Future 
Climate change necessitates that electricity from 
 
Americans are significantly more likely to think that global warming should be a 
U.S. governmental priority); LEISEROWITZ & AKERLOF, supra note 262, at 7. Note, 
however, that most surveys focus on the correlation between attitudes towards 
climate change and race, rather than income. Thus, although there is a long-
standing correlation between minority status and lower incomes in the United 
States, these surveys do not document a specific relationship between income 
status and climate change attitudes. Cf. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE 
D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2013, at 5 (Sept. 2014), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/ 
publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SF2-7XBU] (showing real 
median household income by race and Hispanic origin, 1967 to 2013). 
 272. See Ottmar Edenhofer et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 
2014) (“Mitigation and adaptation can positively or negatively influence the 
achievement of other societal goals, such as those related to human health, food 
security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods, and 
equitable sustainable development . . . .”).  
 273. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) (defining sustainable development 
as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”).  
 274. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global 
Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2115 (2005) (describing the results of the 
sustainable development movement as “decidedly mixed, both in terms of 
conceptual clarity and programmatic success”). 
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particular sources and at particular times become more 
expensive.  To meet this challenge, regulators in leading states 
have opted to create a more participatory grid that allows 
consumers to manage the timing and source of their electricity 
consumption.275 Consumers who do not take advantage of these 
opportunities will pay escalating rates that reflect the cost of 
financing large-scale changes in generation and transmission 
infrastructure.  In this model, participation in the grid becomes 
the means for maintaining affordable electricity, which is itself 
ever more necessary to flourish in the American economy and 
civil society. 
What implications does this move have for regulators’ 
ongoing duties to ensure “just and reasonable rates” and 
widespread access? At an empirical level, as Part I illustrated, 
it may well be that certain clean energy policies are not as 
harmful to low-income consumers as interested parties would 
have regulators believe, particularly in the short run. Where 
they do prove harmful, addressing problems of cross-
subsidization will be important in addressing clean energy 
justice concerns. Many novel attempts are underway to 
properly value the contribution of clean energy technologies to 
the grid276 in ways that do not fundamentally undermine the 
adoption of clean energy policy, and these are worth 
encouraging. 
However, reliance on this approach alone is shortsighted 
and incomplete. In the long run, even after cross-subsidies are 
eliminated, the clean energy policies that states are pursuing 
may collectively create an America once again divided on 
electricity grounds: the rich to their new set of wondrous 
appliances, which save them money while doing good for the 
planet, and the poor to their aging grid infrastructure, a 
crumbling relic of past abundance that requires considerable 
investment to decarbonize. This vision is hardly in accord with 
electricity law’s twentieth-century commitments to widespread 
electrification and affordability. 
To avoid this outcome while inducing necessary shifts in 
electricity consumption, electricity law requires an updated 
version of the twentieth-century’s project of electrification. In 
place of electrification, we require clean electrification: a 
 
 275. See supra Part I.A. 
 276. See, e.g., supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
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widening of access to the participatory grid.277 
Lawmakers, regulators, and the public should care about 
broadening grid participation for two reasons. The first is that 
the history of electricity law demonstrates an abiding 
commitment to providing widespread access to affordable 
power. The only way for a consumer to maintain affordability 
in states that create a participatory grid will be to become a 
part of this project. Rates will rise for those who do not pay 
attention to patterns of energy use, shift times of consumption, 
or generate their own electricity. Although we might be 
comfortable with this outcome in the case of consumers who 
simply choose to pay more in order to maintain the convenience 
of a twentieth-century lifestyle, our history indicates a deep 
discomfort with allowing class dimensions to determine the 
ability to access affordable power. 
A class rift in electricity access presents particular cause 
for concern in the current context of widening inequality, and 
widening “energy poverty” in particular.278 The number of 
households eligible for income-based energy assistance 
increased 70 percent between 1981 and 2008, from around 19 
to 33 million.279 These households continue to spend around 
 
 277. In May 2016, the New York Public Service Commission—which has been 
a leader in considering issues of energy justice and clean energy—explicitly 
embraced something akin to the principle of “clean electrification” I advocate here. 
In adopting a new form of utility compensation under its “Reforming the Energy 
Vision” proceeding, the Commission espoused the following principle regarding 
access: “Customers with low and moderate incomes or who may be vulnerable to 
losing service for other reasons should have access to energy efficiency and other 
mechanisms that ensure they have electricity at an affordable cost.” Proceeding 
on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, No. 14-
M-0101, at 112 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n May 19, 2016) (order). Cf. SOVACOOL & 
DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 246 (calling for a similar principle of utilizing 
renewable technologies to electrify low-income communities internationally). 
 278. Energy poverty’s definition is not without debate, but it is frequently 
defined as spending more than ten percent of household income on energy. See, 
e.g., Stephen Bird & Diana Hernández, Policy Options for the Split Incentive: 
Increasing Energy Efficiency for Low-Income Renters, 48 ENERGY POL’Y 506, 507 
(2012). See also SOVACOOL & DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 231 (defining “fuel 
poverty” as spending “more than 10 or 15 percent of . . . monthly income on energy 
bills”).  
 279. The predominant source of this assistance is the federal Low-Income 
Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). See APRISE INC., LIHEAP Home 
Energy Notebook for Fiscal Year 2008, at 29 (2010) [hereinafter LIHEAP 2008]. 
Only around 15 percent of those qualifying for LIHEAP actually receive 
assistance due to limited funding, and funding per household also decreased 10 
percent between 1981 and 2008. See id.; see also Hernández & Bird, supra note 
217, at 25; LIHEAP 2008, at xi. A more recent study found that “[o]ver the last 
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fourteen percent of their income on home energy, as compared 
to an average household expenditure of 7.4 percent.280 
Consequently, in one survey half of low-income households 
reported having to reduce spending for basic necessities in 
order to meet their energy needs during periods of financial 
instability,281 and 80 percent reported “commonly . . . having 
problems with utilities that include[] lack of affordability, 
arrearages, and shut-offs.”282 These consumers are the ones 
who would most benefit from tools that give them the ability to 
control energy bills, but are least likely to have the resources 
necessary to take advantage of participatory grid policies. To do 
nothing to promote their access to the participatory grid risks 
undermining much of the historical purpose of electricity law. 
Moreover, those who face energy poverty are often under 
what is essentially a triple assault, with environmental justice, 
climate change justice, and now, clean energy justice 
challenges concentrated in the same group of individuals.283 
Although the overlap is not perfect, many of the same 
communities who bear a disproportionate burden of 
environmental hazards, and who face the greatest risks (at 
least domestically) with respect to climate change, are also the 
ones who will have the hardest time participating in the 
technology-heavy clean energy transition. The triple burden of 
harm faced by these communities provides all the more reason 
for regulators to focus on broadening participatory grid access 
as a key strategy of clean energy justice. 
 
decade alone, electricity expenditures as a proportion of low-income household 
budgets increased by a third, while falling for higher earners.” PATRICK SABOL, 
FROM POWER TO EMPOWERMENT: PLUGGING LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES INTO THE 
CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 1 (2015), http://groundswell.org/frompower_ 
to_empowerment_wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W99-457Y].  
 280. LIHEAP 2008, supra note 279, at i. The “very poor” often spend more than 
20 percent of income on energy. Hernández  & Bird, supra note 217, at 7.  
 281. Lynne Chester, Energy Impoverishment: Addressing Capitalism’s New 
Driver of Inequality, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 395, 395 (2014) (explaining how increased 
energy bills lead to “social exclusion”).  
 282. Hernández  & Bird, supra note 217, at 11 (reporting results of a 72-
household field survey conducted in an inner-city Boston neighborhood).  
 283. GORDON WALKER, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 193 (2012) (describing the 
“double injustice” that arises from the fact that climate change will most harm 
those already subject to the greatest environmental hazards).  
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C. Beyond Economic Consequences 
Affordability concerns alone justify a clean electrification 
agenda, given the importance of electricity to participation in 
the modern economy and society. But there is a second reason 
that a commitment to clean electrification matters, which goes 
beyond the economics of grid participation and speaks to the 
purposes of grid interconnection in the first place. Lawmakers 
have treated electricity as a special, foundational good because 
it enhances citizens’ ability to lead productive, participatory 
lives across multiple dimensions. Not only did electricity 
provide relief from back-breaking and repetitive farm and 
factory labor, but it also—via lamps for reading, radio, and 
increased leisure time—made people feel part of a polis in ways 
that had been previously unimaginable.284 Indeed, it was the 
process of connecting to the grid itself that engendered these 
feelings for many rural Americans, through the sense of 
empowerment they experienced in forming and managing 
electric cooperatives.285 
The participatory grid provides an interesting opportunity 
for reimagining these ideas of grid access as participation 
enabling, given its inherently “participatory” nature. To be 
sure, as discussed in Part I, grid participation offers perhaps a 
bereft version of participation as compared to the community 
spirit of electric cooperatives or direct democratic engagement 
in debates about climate policy formation. But it appears to be 
a growing method of engaging Americans in climate change 
and part of a broad trend in U.S. society of using the market as 
a locus of public engagement.286 
Though individualistic and market oriented, the 
participatory grid provides an outlet for such civic engagement. 
I have witnessed friends, all agog at their new solar panels, 
unable to take their eyes off of their iPhone app tracking the 
panels’ real-time output. Their delight at seeing moments of 
over-production, when their panels were making more power 
than their home was consuming, was more than the 
satisfaction of saving a few cents. It was a feeling of control and 
 
 284. See supra notes 204–205 and accompanying text.  
 285. Cf. LILIENTHAL, supra note 199, at 76–77 (describing the importance of 
the TVA’s “democratic methods,” which induced “widespread and intimate 
participation” by the people of Appalachia in the project of rural electrification). 
 286. Kysar, supra note 74, at 533.  
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contribution, of having done their part to fight a problem that 
frequently induces feelings of helplessness and fatalism.287 
Psychologists sometimes refer to this feeling as “warm glow.”288 
And indeed, the new Nest thermostat—which “automatically 
adapts as your life and the seasons change” in order to keep 
you comfortable while cutting electricity bills—seems to have 
taken the warm glow notion literally, with a thermostat that 
“lights up when you walk in the room,” as if to imply that after 
installing it, you are doing good just by existing.289 
These examples highlight the psychological component of 
participation in the participatory grid: not only does 
participating save one money, it also creates a sense of 
contributing to a project larger than oneself.290 The 
psychological benefits of grid participation are two-fold: first, 
consumers benefit from the belief that their cuts in emissions 
improve the world; second, and apart from actual impact, they 
benefit from “the ability to express their moral and political 
views” through choosing to participate—and how to 
participate—in the grid.291 These psychological benefits appear 
to hold even in the context of fully cost-justified clean energy 
investments.292 In other words, even though states are 
 
 287. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN 
PSYCHOLOGY & GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE: ADDRESSING A MULTI-FACETED PHENOMENON AND SET OF CHALLENGES 
80 (observing that climate change can cause “fear, despair, or a sense of being 
overwhelmed or powerless [that] can inhibit thought and action”). 
 288. See Roland Menges et al., Altruism, Warm Glow and the Willingness-to-
Donate for Green Electricity: An Artefactual Field Experiment, 31 ENVTL. & RES. 
ECON. 431, 432 (2005) (finding that consumers purchasing green energy get a 
“warm glow” from knowing they are contributing to environmental quality); 
Patrick Hartmann & Vanessa Apaolaza-Ibáñez, Consumer Attitude and Purchase 
Intention Toward Green Energy Brands: The Roles of Psychological Benefits and 
Environmental Concern, 65 J. BUS. RES. 1254, 1254 (2012) (identifying “warm 
glow feelings derived from the moral satisfaction of contributing to the common 
good” as one of green energy’s psychological benefits). 
 289. Meet the Nest Thermostat, https://nest.com/thermostat/meet-nest-
thermostat/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RVQ4-PDPP]. 
 290. See supra note 288. 
 291. Kysar, supra note 74, at 581, 604 (explaining how consumers derive 
satisfaction across multiple dimensions by participating in market-shaping 
purchasing decisions through both believing that their choices have real-world 
impact and finding self-expressive value in the act of choosing).  
 292. See Varun Rai & Kristine McAndrews, Decision-making and Behavior 
Change in Residential Adopters of Solar PV, https://ases.conference-
services.net/resources/252/2859/pdf/SOLAR2012_0785_full%20paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q63P-8DRD] (surveying homeowners’ decisions to install net-
metered solar panels and finding that environmental concern was equal in 
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constructing a model where financial benefits alone might 
justify grid participation, it appears that many of those 
participating derive psychological satisfaction in addition to 
financial gain. 
If low(er)-income consumers are disempowered in this 
transformation, they lose the ability to play a role in solving 
one of the greatest collective action problems our country and 
world have ever faced. Whereas electrification empowered a 
broader swath of Americans across multiple dimensions, the 
participatory grid risks disempowerment not only through 
escalating costs but also through segmentation of Americans’ 
ability to become a part of the political project of mitigating 
climate change, channeled as it is through consumer-oriented 
grid policies. A project to extend access to the participatory grid 
is thus important on a level that transcends economics and 
allows electricity law’s commitment to engendering civic 
participation to endure, even as that participation takes new 
shapes in today’s market-oriented society.293 
This argument over the centrality of participation as a 
component of clean energy justice reflects lessons learned 
during the rise of the environmental justice movement. What 
began in environmental justice as a concern over unequal 
distribution of environmental hazards and benefits quickly 
grew to have a participatory dimension, as communities 
recognized that voice and access in decisions affecting their 
environment and health were a critical component of the 
justice they sought.294 Similarly, creating a just participatory 
grid will require more than regulatory tweaks to limit cross-
subsidization; it requires taking the steps necessary to create 
full, equal opportunity for engagement in the new grid 
paradigm. 
 
importance to financial benefits). 
 293. Cf. SOVACOOL & DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 245 (arguing that “energy 
systems ought to maximize welfare . . . in the ability to enable persons to realize 
functionings and capabilities,” and that “every person has a right to a ‘social 
minimum’ of energy or electricity so that they can enjoy a modern, healthy 
lifestyle”).  
 294. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 1, at 13, 16; WALKER, supra note 283, at 
218–19 (arguing for distributive, procedural, and recognition dimensions to 
environmental justice). 
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D. Recognizing the Challenges 
Although there are important parallels with electrification, 
clean electrification is a more contentious and complex 
program than its historical counterpart. We could all connect to 
the grid. We cannot all put solar panels on our roofs; we will 
not become a nation of “yeoman windfarmers.”295 There are 
practical limits to where such technologies are appropriate296 
and technological limits to how much distributed generation 
can be integrated into the grid without causing blackouts.297 
Similarly, any possibility of widespread, grid exit via a 
combination of on-site generation and storage is not likely soon 
and presents its own complicated trade-offs.298 But not all 
participatory grid technologies are so constrained. Many 
technologies focus on shifting the time and shape of demand in 
ways that not only are free of scale limitations, but also work to 
allow more distributed generation to participate in the grid. In 
particular, “good old energy efficiency” and demand response 
are likely to prove options available to all households, without 
any corresponding downside in terms of technological limits to 
participation.299 
 
 295. Douglas A. Kysar, The Consultant’s Republic, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 
2056 (2008) (reviewing TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK 
THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF 
POSSIBILITY (2007)) (critiquing a vision of a “new social future” comprised of 
“yeoman windfarmers forming Toquevillian associations on MySpace” as a way to 
advance environmental aims). 
 296. See Booth, supra note 92, at 768 (explaining that 75 percent of ratepayers 
do not own homes with roofs “structurally suitable” for solar). 
 297. See MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 53–76 (2011) (explaining the intermittency 
challenges of solar and wind, which are not available on demand but rather at the 
whims of nature, which creates a need for alternative sources that can quickly 
respond to changes in wind or solar supply). See also Cardwell, supra note 131 
(reporting on rooftop-solar-induced “voltage fluctuations that can overload 
circuits, burn lines and lead to brownouts or blackouts”). There is, predictably, 
debate over precisely how much distributed generation the grid is capable of 
handling. See, e.g., Jeff St. John, How Much Renewable Energy Can the Grid 
Handle?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/ 
articles/read/on-the-uncertain-edge-of-the-renewable-powered-grid [https://perm 
a.cc/5WCC-ZXH9].   
 298. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE INTEGRATED GRID 16–20 (2014) 
(making the case that grid connection is more valuable than is often appreciated, 
both for individual consumers and for the sake of the system).  
 299. See MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 297, at 57 (describing how demand 
response can provide operating reserves to counterbalance renewables’ 
intermittency).  
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Clean electrification, with its focus on specifically 
empowering grid participation, might be challenged by that 
camp of economists who would advise against any effort to 
effectuate redistribution other than through the income tax 
scheme.300 Their argument, in brief, is that climate change 
mitigation policies provide an inefficient avenue for alleviating 
present-day distributional inequities, such that society would 
be better served by implementing all efficient clean energy 
policies and compensating for any resulting inequities through 
tax redistribution.301 
One problem with this argument is that solving the 
participatory grid’s equity challenges via tax redistribution is 
unlikely to be a realistic political strategy.302 Perhaps a more 
feasible strategy would be to simply increase traditional 
welfare-type benefits for energy, under LIHEAP and its state 
equivalents. Increased support for meeting mounting energy 
bills would certainly help those unable to participate in the 
grid cope with energy poverty, but may be ill-advised for 
several reasons. First, increasing levels of financial support for 
families struggling to pay their electricity bills fails to reflect 
the societal importance of reducing electricity demand—to the 
contrary, it may perversely incentivize more consumption.303 
Second, even if families wanted to spend any additional 
support they received on-demand reduction technologies, they 
would still face well-documented investment barriers that can 
be eliminated only by more targeted regulatory 
interventions.304 
 
 300. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the 
Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000).  
 301. See generally id.; see also POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 258 at 4, 175.  
 302. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Introduction to FAIRNESS 
IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 5 (Univ. of Chicago Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working 
Paper No. 489, 2014) (arguing that the high political costs of tax redistribution 
may make it cheaper to redistribute outside the tax scheme); Daniel A. Farber, 
Climate Justice, 110 MICH. L. REV. 985, 989 (2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & 
DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (2011)) (“To say that we should not 
engage in redistribution unless we can implement the ideal form of redistribution 
is really to say that we should not engage in redistribution at all.”). 
 303. See Rhett Larson, Adapting Human Rights, 26 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
1 (2015) (arguing that increased subsidies for electricity “preclude cost 
internalization and conservation incentives,” and might “aggravate the 
sustainability challenges associated with global climate change”). 
 304. See, e.g., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., OVERCOMING 
MARKET BARRIERS & USING MARKET FORCES TO ADVANCE ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
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More fundamentally, neither a strategy of tax reform nor 
increasing traditional energy welfare payments accords with 
the normative commitment that the country has developed to 
electricity as foundational to meaningful lives and 
livelihoods.305 In the twentieth century, legislators and 
regulators focused on expanding access to electricity because 
they valued its spread in particular, not merely more equal 
distribution of goods in general. In a similar vein, there might 
be sound reasons for commissions and legislatures to prefer 
targeted support in the case of clean energy, rather than 
income tax redistribution or increased bill support, because 
they place value upon enhancing the ability of all citizens to 
join the participatory grid.306 In choosing to subsidize 
participation in the grid rather than consumption, regulators 
help shape norms that place particular value on becoming a 
part of the project to reduce energy consumption.307 Because of 
this interrelationship between regulatory design and norms, 
redistribution via the tax code or increased bill support would 
lack much of the normative force of widening grid 
participation. 
IV.  IMPLEMENTING CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION 
Once lawmakers are convinced of the imperative to pursue 
an agenda of clean electrification, questions abound regarding 
implementation. In this Part, I want to make three broad 
points on this topic without purporting to craft a 
comprehensive agenda, which will have to occur on a state-by-
state basis, ideally with significant community participation.308 
First, public utility law provides some room for promoting clean 
electrification but cannot unilaterally achieve the vision, just 
as it could not unilaterally electrify America. Second, although 
 
2–3 (2014) (collecting commonly identified failures that prevent full achievement 
of cost-effective energy efficiency). 
 305. See supra Part I. 
 306. Cf. Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. 
REV. 1393, 1396–97 (1981) (explaining how many of our laws appropriately reflect 
preferences for ends other than efficiency).  
 307. Cf. Jerry Mashaw, Accountability & Institutional Design: Some Thoughts 
on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS 
& EXPERIENCES 135 (Michael Dowdle ed., 2006) (describing how provision of goods 
and services is itself “a regime of social control that entails norm creation”). 
 308. Cf. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 1, at 106 (explaining the importance of 
participation in the environmental justice movement).  
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we must therefore rely on legislation, we need not despair at 
this prospect: existing mechanisms for promoting clean energy 
might be tailored specifically towards promoting clean 
electrification in ways that do not necessitate significant new 
expenditures. And third, in moving forward with 
conceptualizing and crafting a participatory grid, lawmakers 
and regulators might place more emphasis on community-scale 
grid participation, not only for its practical ability to broaden 
participation, but for its more collective valence. 
A. Clean Electrification within Public Utility Law 
Public utility law’s “just and reasonable” rates and “no 
undue discrimination” standards have endured the test of time 
largely because they have proven malleable.309 As public 
sentiment and policy priorities have shifted, so have legal 
understandings. Dynamic pricing rests on a new 
understanding that time-based discrimination is just, given the 
need to avoid building ever more infrastructure.310 And 
commissions concerned with environmental outcomes have 
increasingly interpreted “just and reasonable” rate standards 
to permit the pursuit of aims other than the cheapest power 
available.311 There is likely room within these concepts for 
promoting widespread inclusion within new participatory grid 
policies, particularly those funded by other ratepayers. For 
example, commissions might interpret these mandates to 
require that ratepayer-funded initiatives be distributed 
relatively evenly among the ratepayers funding them, as 
California has recently done in requiring ten percent of its 
solar incentives to go to low-income households.312 Just and 
reasonable rate standards could also justify placing protections 
on dynamic pricing programs to ensure that they do not 
 
 309. Trebing, supra note 21, at 31 (noting regulators’ “strong desire to 
maintain flexibility or a large area of discretion in applying equity judgments”). 
 310. See Paul Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly, in The HANDBOOK OF 
LAW & ECON. 92 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) http://economics.mit.edu/files/1180 [https://perma.cc/2NRN-ZCZQ] 
(explaining that dynamic pricing avoids being labeled price discrimination 
because “peak and off-peak consumption are essentially separate products”). 
 311. See Michael Dworkin, David Farnsworth & Jason Rich, The 
Environmental Duties of Public Utilities Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
325, 327 (2001). 
 312. See Distributed Generation & Distributed Energy Res., D. 06-01-024, 2006 
WL 162584 (Cal. Pub. Util. Jan. 12, 2006) 5, 39–40 (interim order).  
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disproportionately harm low-income consumers over time.313 
Two prominent policy debates occurring at commissions 
around the country are also amenable to incorporating clean 
electrification concerns. The first is the regulatory debate over 
how to harness new data that the modernized grid provides. 
Smart meters provide “interval data” that measure energy 
consumption granularly, in as little as fifteen-minute 
intervals.314 These data can show where participatory grid 
technologies might prove most beneficial—both 
environmentally and economically—in a much more targeted 
way than has previously been possible, and could thus be 
useful in efforts to design programs to empower more 
consumers as grid participants.315 However, due to privacy 
concerns, questions of who owns and has access to these data 
have proven controversial in many states.316 
A commitment to clean electrification might help shape 
commissions’ legal choices about how to manage this data. 
Reforming data policies would be a cost-effective step for many 
commissions to take in exploring a clean electrification agenda. 
Concrete data pointing to the potential for low-income 
households to save energy could spur new programs and 
suggest new directions in which to tailor existing programs.317 
Better data analysis could also allow for the design of dynamic 
pricing schemes that appropriately protect and empower 
consumers.318 For all of these reasons, in proceeding with 
debates over consumer privacy versus the benefits of open 
access, scholars, advocates, and regulators should keep in mind 
the ways in which more information could help diffuse 
technologies more broadly, beyond those consumers self-
motivated to seek them out. 
Clean electrification considerations will also be important 
in the question facing commissions about utilities’ role in the 
participatory grid. One of the ways in which utilities might 
 
 313. Cf. Faruqui, supra note 108 (suggesting such limits).  
 314. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, AN ASSESSMENT OF 
INTERVAL DATA AND THEIR POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO RESIDENTIAL 
ELECTRICITY END-USE MONITORING, U.S. 1 (Feb. 2015).  
 315. See STEPHENS, WILSON & PETERSON, supra note 26, at 88–91. 
 316. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 59, at 88. 
 317. Cf. id. at 71 (noting that “one of the critical barriers” to accomplishing 
known potential energy efficiency savings “is adequate data on energy 
consumption”). 
 318. See FARUQUI, HLEDIK & PALMER, supra note 62. 
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reinvigorate their business model to compete in changing 
energy markets is to themselves become owners or sellers of 
participatory grid technologies.319 The idea, however, is 
controversial: it risks giving utilities precisely the market 
power that a decentralized marketplace hopes to suppress via 
innovation.320 Opponents worry that regulated utilities might 
use their regulated monopoly status to undercut competitive, 
independent service providers, thereby dampening the market 
for such services in the long term.321 
Clean energy justice concerns, though, may point towards 
the benefits of at least a limited role for utilities in this context. 
Utilities have historical relationships with a wide range of 
consumers and may be able to reach low-income consumers 
more easily—and with a greater level of trust—than third-
party service providers can.322 For this reason, New York 
recently decided to make an exception to its general rule 
restricting utility ownership of participatory grid technologies 
and will allow utilities to own technology used in programs 
targeting low or moderate income customers.323 This strategy 
might prove a powerful force for incentivizing utilities to focus 
on this otherwise potentially neglected group. As other states 
grapple with the same utility ownership debate, they should 
consider the benefits of permitting utilities to have a special 
role in broadening participation in evolving markets. 
B. The Limits of Public Utility Law 
If these reform proposals seem modest, it is for good 
reason: there are obvious limits to public utility law’s abilities 
 
 319. See Troy A. Rule, Unnatural Monopolies: Why Utilities Don’t Belong in 
Rooftop Solar Markets, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 387, 402 (2016) (describing a number of 
utility efforts to use this “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” strategy).  
 320. See N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 43–44 (describing utility 
ownership of distributed energy resources (DER) as “one of the most contentious 
issues in the REV proceeding,” and concluding that “unrestricted utility 
participation in DER markets presents a risk of undermining markets more than 
a potential for accelerating market growth”). 
 321. See id.; see also Rule, supra note 319, at 4–5 (arguing that allowing 
utilities to compete in rooftop solar markets “stacks the deck” in favor of the 
utilities). 
 322. See Graffy & Kihm, supra note 14, at 38 (“Utilities have several well-
established characteristics that become chief assets in an environment of flux: 
namely a reputation of service reliability, customer trust, and name recognition.”). 
 323. N.Y. REV Feb. 26 Order, supra note 33, at 45–46. 
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to resolve disparities within the participatory grid. Public 
utility law is likely to prove an innovation and a constraint for 
clean electrification, just as it was for twentieth-century 
electrification. 
Commissions control many decisions shaping the 
electricity grid and electricity supply, but they face an 
important internal constraint: ratepayer funding.324 In some 
cases, expanding programs like energy efficiency and demand 
response to a broader group of consumers can lower the rates 
paid by all, such that commissions can justify the expenditure 
of ratepayer funding.325 However, energy law’s equity 
commitment suggests that it may be worthwhile to invest 
public resources in clean electrification projects beyond those 
that immediately negate other grid expenditures.326 In these 
cases, particularly in a system increasingly concerned about 
chasing away the most affluent ratepayers while retaining 
those of lesser means, a ratepayer-funded support system will 
make less and less sense.327 
For these reasons, it probably will require legislative 
efforts to fully accomplish an agenda of clean electrification, 
funded not exclusively by ratepayers, but by taxpayers as a 
whole. Such efforts will be challenging; after all, one of the 
primary appeals of “taxation by regulation” was its ability to 
make the costs of achieving redistribution less apparent.328 
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions are beginning to make 
progress on this front. For example, Washington, D.C.’s city 
council passed a new renewable portfolio standard in 2016 that 
not only requires the city to source 50 percent of its electricity 
from renewables by 2032, but also establishes a “Solar for All” 
fund to assist with a new mandate to “reduce by at least 50% 
 
 324. See Posner, supra note 21; Gray, supra note 172.  
 325. See, e.g., Petition of Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. for Approval of 
Brooklyn Queens Demand Mgmt. Program., 14-E-0302, 2014 WL 7049164, at *1–
5 (N.Y.P.S.C. Dec. 12, 2014) (approving the acquisition of 41 megawatts of rate-
payer funded, consumer-side solutions in low-income communities as a way to 
delay building expensive sub-transmission infrastructure). 
 326. Cf. Scott, supra note 135, at 390 (arguing that commissions have 
historically only approved efficiency and diversity of supply initiatives when they 
would “maximize cost savings” or at least “would not add to customer rates”). 
 327. Cf. Posner, supra note 21, at 46 (observing that it is a “little peculiar” to 
subsidize the customers of a certain regulated industry via other customers of the 
same industry, rather than via taxpayers at large).  
 328. Id.; see supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text for discussion of the 
concept of “taxation by regulation.” 
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the electric bills of at least 100,000 of the District’s low-income 
households with high energy burdens” by 2032.329 Further 
possibilities for targeting low-income communities may emerge 
if states move forward with Clean Power Plan 
implementation330: the Plan’s optional “Clean Energy Incentive 
Program” is designed to help states “meet their goals under the 
plan by removing barriers to investment in energy efficiency 
and solar measures in low-income communities.”331 
Legislative efforts to train clean energy efforts in more 
equitable directions need not entail the creation of entirely new 
programs. Many states are already innovating in clean energy 
finance, and these models could be extended and targeted for a 
clean electrification agenda.332 State “green banks” in 
particular have gained traction recently. Green banks leverage 
existing public funding in order to attract greater private sector 
funds for clean energy and energy efficiency projects.333 They 
do so by using financing tools that are self-sustaining, like on-
bill financing, credit enhancements, bonds, and co-
investments.334 Connecticut, New York, Hawaii, and Vermont 
 
 329. Council B. No. B21-0650, the Renewable Portfolio Standard Expansion 
Amendment Act of 2016 (D.C. 2016) (signed July 25, 2016). In adopting a similar 
50 percent RPS requirement, to be met by 2030, and doubling energy efficiency 
requirements for existing buildings, California also mandated that its Public 
Utilities Commission “develop and publish a study on barriers for low-income 
customers to energy efficiency and weatherization investments, including those in 
disadvantaged communities, as well as recommendations on how to increase 
access to energy efficiency and weatherization investments to low-income 
customers.” That study is due before January 1, 2017. See S.B. 350, 2015–16 Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2015) (adopted Sept. 2015). 
 330. See supra note 38 for details on the current legal status of the Clean 
Power Plan. 
 331. See EPA, Clean Energy Incentive Program, https://www.epa.gov/ 
cleanpowerplan/clean-energy-incentive-program (last visited August 26, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/K7TQ-J25X].  
 332. See, e.g., Sandeep Nandivada, Energy-Efficiency Retrofits in the 
Commercial Sector: An Analysis of PACE Financing, On-Bill Repayment, and 
Energy Savings Performance Contracts, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 363, 366–67 
(2014); Neil Peretz, Growing the Energy Efficiency Market Through Third-Party 
Financing, 30 ENERGY L.J. 377, 391–92 (2009); Jason R. Wiener & Christian 
Alexander, On-Site Renewable Energy and Public Finance: How and Why 
Municipal Bond Financing Is the Key to Propagating Access to on-Site Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
559, 559–60 (2010); Art Harrington & Amy Heart, PACE Financing Opportunities 
for Environmental and Energy Lawyers, 29 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 8, 8 (2014); see 
BERLIN ET AL., supra note 46; see also Hallie Kennan, State Green Banks for Clean 
Energy, (Energy Innovation, Working Paper Jan. 2014).  
 333. See Kennan, supra note 332, at 1–2; BERLIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 1.  
 334. Kennan, supra note 332, at 1.  
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are leading a growing number of states in adopting green bank 
programs.335 
In addition, many states retain significant, more 
traditional financing structures, which provide incentives and 
rebates to consumers for the installation of a number of 
technologies, including energy efficiency and distributed 
generation.336 And state-level cap-and-trade programs provide 
a substantial source of revenue for those states that choose to 
sell off, rather than give away, greenhouse gas emissions 
permits.337 
These tools that spur clean energy could also drive clean 
electrification. But in order for them to do so, program 
designers must make enabling widespread participation a 
priority. Programs could expand several different ways. One 
option is set-asides, such as California’s reservation of ten 
percent of its “California Solar Initiative” funding for low-
income residences,338 and the state’s requirement that twenty-
five percent of revenues from its cap-and-trade auctions go to 
projects that benefit identified disadvantaged communities.339 
Or, programs could enable wider participation by targeting 
either particular types of consumers or particular technologies: 
for example, green banks might extend clean energy loan 
guarantees on behalf of those whose credit scores would 
otherwise not qualify them for funding; or incentive and rebate 
programs might specifically target technologies that 
administrators determine are best suited for helping low-
income households reduce energy usage.340 Such efforts might 
 
 335. Id. at 4.  
 336. See BERLIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 6 (explaining that historically, state 
programs have “tended to focus mostly on individual project financing and 
deployment through the use of one-off rebates, grants and performance-based 
incentives that have directly subsidized the installation of clean energy 
technologies”). 
 337. See, e.g., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, INC., INVESTMENT OF 
RGGI PROCEEDS THROUGH 2013, at 5 (2015) (reporting that participating states 
spent $1.02 billion, out of $1.57 billion earned from the cap-and-trade program, in 
energy efficiency and renewable energy investments).  
 338. See supra note 312.  
 339. See S.B. 535, 2011–12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adopted Sept. 30. 2012). 
 340. One example of an effort in this vein is the Obama Administration’s 
recent announcement of a new “Clean Energy Savings For All Initiative,” which 
operates primarily by tweaking existing financing programs to ensure that federal 
mortgage requirements do not stand in the way of property owners installing 
solar programs financed through bill savings. See Press Release, The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Obama Administration 
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also include targeted outreach to low-income communities, 
which has been shown effective in increasing levels of 
participation.341 
Ultimately, my goal here is not to pick among these policy 
options, but rather to make a broader point with respect to 
these and other potential programs: a deeper understanding of 
energy law’s focus on access should embolden legislators and 
regulators to restructure clean energy policies in directions 
that enable broader grid participation. It is time to move away 
from equity as an argument against clean energy, towards a 
broader understanding of energy equity that demands a 
widening of access to the participatory grid. 
C. Beyond Individualism 
This Article has largely taken the unfolding participatory 
grid vision as a given. It has accepted regulators’ dominant 
concept of the participatory grid as revolving around 
empowered consumers who are incentivized to act within the 
confines of their own property to construct a new relationship 
with the grid—a relationship likely to be automated to the 
point that it in fact involves limited “participation” in the 
traditional sense. But the vision remains largely inchoate, 
making it worth asking whether this is the “participatory” grid 
we want. 
There is emerging evidence that many people prefer to 
engage in climate mitigation as community members rather 
than as consumers.342 We like knowing that others are 
contributing, and we gain empowerment through 
collectivity.343 These recent findings resonate with the U.S. 
 
Announces Clean Energy Savings for All Americans Initiative (July 19, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/19/fact-sheet-obama-
administration-announces-clean-energy-savings-all [https://perma.cc/QDE6-
XPZ9]. Whether program administrators and regulators—rather than executives 
or legislators—could make decisions to target low-income consumers or 
technologies would depend on the authorizing language of the program in 
question.  
 341. Hernández & Bird, supra note 217, at 19. 
 342. Eva Heiskanen et al., Low-Carbon Communities as a Context for 
Individual Behavioural Change, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 7586, 7586 (2010).  
 343. Id.; cf. Robyn Bolton, The Persuasive Pressure of Peer Rankings, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (May 13, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/05/the-persuasive-pressure-of-peer-
rankings [https://perma.cc/N8PG-UZ8E]  (describing how energy efficiency 
companies use peer data to induce greater savings among neighbors). 
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experience of rural electrification almost a century ago: 
working together to finance and build power lines imbued 
communities with a sense of democratic spirit beyond what 
might have been accomplished had the lines been subsidized 
through general tax revenue.344 
In several states, legislators and regulators have adopted 
versions of participatory grid policies that help to foster more 
collective notions of participation. One concept that has caught 
hold recently is that of “community net metering,” which allows 
for multiple consumers to purchase shares in a single net-
metered system—often called a “solar garden”—that can be 
located off-site but whose generation is credited to the 
participating consumers’ energy bills.345 At least eleven states 
and Washington, D.C. have authorized community net 
metering or related pilot projects.346 These efforts may 
significantly improve the ability of low-income consumers to 
participate in self-generation, as they eliminate the 
prerequisite of owning a solar-appropriate home.347 Solar 
gardens also ease the burdens of participation, as they do not 
require each participant to individually seek out, install, and 
maintain solar panels.348 As champions of such projects have 
noted, such projects can also make good use of blighted lands, 
take advantage of economies of scale available to larger-scale 
systems, raise awareness of solar power through placement in 
public areas, and provide participants the same “tangible sense 
of investment in energy production” that home solar panels 
 
 344. Cf. Part II.B.  
 345. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-127 (West 2015) (defining a 
“community solar garden” as a solar facility belonging to at least ten subscribers 
located “in or near a community”); See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 140 
(West 2016); see also Herman K. Trabish, How Virtual Net Metering Will Save 
Low Income Massachusetts Residents $60 Million, UTILITYDIVE (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-virtual-net-metering-will-save-low-income-
massachusetts-residents-60-m/342105/[https://perma.cc/C3SV-MQUR] (explaining 
how virtual net metering can help low-income consumers who cannot install 
distributed generation on-site reap the bill savings of net metering). 
 346. See Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates, NAT’L 
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-
metering-policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx  (last visited Sept. 3, 
2015) [https://perma.cc/V5G3-MFWF]. Those states are California, Colorado, 
Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, 
Vermont and Washington. Id.  
 347. See Samantha Booth, Community Solar: Reviving California’s 
Commitment to A Bright Energy Future, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10585, 10585 (2013). 
 348. Id. at 10588.  
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do.349 And the community scale of the projects creates “mutual 
support and understanding” among adopters that can make 
investing in such projects less intimidating and more 
rewarding.350 
Another community-scale effort gaining traction is that of 
“micro-grids,” technically defined as “a group of interconnected 
loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined 
electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity 
with respect to the grid.”351 In practical terms, such systems 
usually involve a combination of distributed generation, 
storage, and demand response resources located within a 
discrete geographic area that are rendered capable of 
functioning separately from the remaining grid.352  Many hope 
such systems might be capable of simultaneously “advancing 
energy sustainability, system resiliency, and consumer 
affordability goals,” and might also reinforce the sense of 
community-scale cooperation and self-sufficiency.353 
These examples illustrate how regulators might begin to 
think more expansively about what “participation” in the grid 
means, and ways that they can engender participation beyond 
individual, house-by-house efforts. Commissions and 
lawmakers have significant roles to play in creating conditions 
where arrangements like community net metering and micro-
grid can flourish. Simply altering legal background rules to 
allow each of these systems to exist would be an important first 
step for most states.354 In the spirit of rural electrification, 
policy-makers might also think about how to extend loans and 
technical support to groups interested in experimenting with 
more collective forms of decarbonizing the grid. 
Finally, it is worth remembering that despite all of the 
recent celebration of the participatory grid as the next frontier 
in electricity law, many—probably most—of the decisions that 
 
 349. Hannah J. Wiseman & Sara C. Bronin, Community-Scale Renewable 
Energy, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 165, 165–66 (2013); Booth, supra 
note 347, at 10591. 
 350. Wiseman & Bronin, supra note 349, at 166.  
 351. Kevin B. Jones et al., The Urban Microgrid: Smart Legal and Regulatory 
Policies to Support Electric Grid Resiliency and Climate Mitigation, 41 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1695, 1697–98 (2014). 
 352. Id. at 1703–04. 
 353. Id. at 1679; see also Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with 
Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547 (2010). 
 354. See Jones et al., supra note 351, at 1712–13; Bronin, supra note 353, at 
547 (noting that “state laws prohibit or severely limit [microgrids’] viability”).  
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we make about how to respond to climate change will not be at 
the individual scale. Instead, we are facing critical strategic 
questions about the future of our collective grid: whether to 
invest heavily in next-generation nuclear facilities, or carbon 
capture and storage, or an offshore transmission corridor for 
wind, or some combination of the above.355 Most of us are likely 
to remain tied to the grid and have a stake in its future shape. 
Irrespective of individual ability to invest in climate change 
solutions, all citizens might have a voice in decisions about the 
future composition of large-scale U.S. electricity generation.356 
Although beyond the scope of this Article, better enabling this 
type of traditional citizen participation should also be one of 
our priorities for clean energy policy. 
V.  CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION 
Stripped to its barest aspirations, the clean energy 
transition is one of switching fuel sources, from those that emit 
greenhouse gases to those that don’t.357 Such a switch might 
alleviate or exacerbate inequality depending on the form it 
takes.358 The participatory grid retains the ability to do either, 
depending on how it is implemented. For this reason, clean 
energy justice concerns raised against dominant clean energy 
policies deserve serious consideration. 
This Article has argued that energy regulators and energy 
law scholars can productively reorient current debates around 
clean energy’s distributive consequences by returning to 
electricity law’s core equity norms. Electricity law’s 
fundamental commitment—imperfectly realized though it has 
been—is to widespread, affordable power, in the service of 
empowering people to lead productive and meaningful lives. 
For lawmakers to proceed with their twenty-first century 
 
 355. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 24.  
 356. Cf. Amartya Sen, Global Warming is Just One of Many Environmental 
Threats that Demand Our Attention, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 22, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/118969/environmentalists-obsess-about-global-
warming-ignore-poor-countries [https://perma.cc/7JKM-RBW2] (urging 
environmentalists and the public to think beyond only the carbon externalities of 
various energy sources).  
 357. See Clark A. Miller, Alastair Iles & Christopher F. Jones, The Social 
Dimensions of Energy Transitions, 22 SCI. AS CULTURE 135, 140 (2013). 
 358. Cf. Sujatha Raman, Fossilizing Renewable Energies, 22 SCI. AS CULTURE 
172, 178 (2013) (questioning whether renewable energy is “intrinsically 
democratic and egalitarian” in ways that some progressives seem to believe).  
9. 88.3 WELTON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2017  7:27 PM 
650 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
project of creating a participatory grid, electricity law demands 
a reorientation of this longstanding norm, focused on 
broadening the range of people able to participate in the grid 
and reap the attendant financial and psychological gains. 
Is an agenda of clean electrification realistic? Proposals for 
redistributional policies are met with understandable 
skepticism in today’s political climate.359 Perhaps counter-
intuitively, Americans’ appetite for redistribution has 
diminished as inequality has increased over the last several 
decades.360 Nevertheless, in this conclusion, I want to briefly 
suggest some reasons for optimism regarding clean 
electrification’s politics. 
There are two reasons that clean electrification should 
prove politically feasible. The first is that clean energy—a 
generally popular aim—cannot move forward without 
attending to its equity implications. Recent survey results 
suggest that around 87 percent of Americans think developing 
clean energy should be a very high (26 percent), high (32 
percent), or medium government priority (28 percent).361 At the 
same time, in part due to the notorious partisanship of 
Congress, federal funding for clean energy has fallen over the 
last several years.362 In its place, states wishing to decarbonize 
will be forced to craft their own strategies to reduce carbon 
 
 359. See Suzanna Sherry, Property is the New Privacy: The Coming 
Constitutional Revolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1475 (2015) (warning of the 
perils of marginalization “[i]f liberal legal academics continue to assume the 
legitimacy of the New Deal and dismiss contrary conservative theory as out of the 
mainstream”). 
 360. See, e.g., Matthew Luttig, The Structure of Inequality and Americans’ 
Attitudes Towards Redistribution, 77 PUB. OPINION Q. 811 (2013). Note, however, 
that this trend may now be shifting. See Noam Scheiber & Dalia Sussman, 
Inequality Troubles Americans Across Party Lines, Times/CBS Poll Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/business/inequality-a-
major-issue-for-americans-times-cbs-poll-finds.html  [https://perma.cc/4NLB-
LK3D] (finding that “the percentage of Americans who say everyone has a fair 
chance to get ahead in today’s economy has fallen 17 percentage points since early 
2014” and support for redistributive policies has risen). 
 361. YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR 
CLIMATE AND CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES IN APRIL 2013, 
http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/article/Climate-Policy-
Support-April-2013#sthash.kCMlJTkh.dpuf [https://perma.cc/ZC5X-JBQH]. 
 362. BERLIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 2; see also MEGAN NICHOLSON & 
MATTHEW STEPP, BREAKING DOWN FEDERAL INVESTMENTS IN CLEAN ENERGY 
(2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-breaking-down-investment-energy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZFJ8-HY75]. 
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emissions,363 putting more pressure on them to aggressively 
pursue and fund clean energy policies. As this Article has 
shown, “equity” can act either as a roadblock for such policies, 
or as a way to widen their reach. Given the depth of regulators’ 
commitment to equity issues, it is quite likely that the only 
way clean energy advocates can achieve the progress they 
desire is to work harder on integrating equity concerns into 
clean energy policies. 
Second, clean electrification might build broad—and odd—
coalitions. Clean electrification is far from a radical solution to 
the equity challenges raised by the participatory grid.364 It is 
rooted in the notion that increased participation in new 
marketplaces, incentivized by price signals, will allow a wide 
swath of Americans to buy down their contributions to climate 
change and thereby maintain affordable power. Accomplishing 
this vision will require the proliferation of new technologies, 
and in this way it closely resembles the original project of 
electrification.365 It is thus unsurprising that some of the same 
companies that supported electrification, including General 
Electric and Westinghouse, show similar enthusiasm for the 
participatory turn in electricity management.366 These 
companies would likely support efforts to extend their new 
technologies to a wider number of American households, as 
would many of the emerging “energy service companies” 
dedicated to helping households take advantage of 
participatory grid incentives.367 
Two other political contingencies might make more 
surprising supporters. As the previous section suggested, even 
utilities, typically cast as the natural opponents of a more 
 
 363. See supra note 38.  
 364. Cf. Kysar, supra note 274, at 2115 (“[C]ampaigns to encourage publicly-
oriented market behavior . . . have the great virtue of avoiding head-on 
confrontation between the competing theoretical conceptions of sustainable 
development and market liberalism.”). 
 365. See supra Part I.C. 
 366. See STEPHENS, WILSON & PETERSON, supra note 26, at 69–70 (noting that 
both incumbents like General Electric and Westinghouse, as well as fledgling 
energy management companies, see the smart grid as a “major business 
opportunity”); see also NAVIGANT RESEARCH, SMART APPLIANCES: INTELLIGENT 
CONTROL, POWER MANAGEMENT, AND NETWORKING TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES ON THE SMART GRID: GLOBAL MARKET ANALYSIS AND 
FORECASTS 2 (2012) (predicting “worldwide smart appliance sales to reach nearly 
$35 billion by 2020”). 
 367. STEPHENS, WILSON & PETERSON, supra note 26, at 69–70.  
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participatory grid, might be given reasons to support clean 
electrification if it can help their faltering business model.368 
And finally, there is a libertarian strain to consumer 
empowerment that makes these policies popular in unexpected 
locales and quarters: in Oklahoma, for example, a movement 
backed by Tea Party conservatives recently convinced the 
state’s Republican governor to resist efforts to impose fees on 
solar panel owners.369 Although libertarians are not likely to 
embrace clean electrification’s redistributive dimension with 
open arms, they might at least come to accept it as a necessary 
component of an agenda of electric self-sufficiency and 
competition. These possible coalitions provide reason for 
optimism about the ability of scholars and lawmakers to create 
and implement clean electrification programs, once properly 
convinced of their place within electricity law. 
Clean electrification provides a way to avoid collision 
between the equities of energy law and the inequities of climate 
change, and represents one important path forward on clean 
energy justice. The urgency of climate change—and the fact 
that none of us can help but contribute to it—suggests that 
never before have we needed to widen participation in a social 
project as much as will be necessary in reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. It is fortunate, then, that U.S. electricity law 
provides its own way forward, from a twentieth-century focus 
on widespread access to the grid, to a twenty-first-century focus 
on broadened participation in the grid. 
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